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The purpose of this Master's (Energy and Development) half thesis is the undertaking 
of a comparative international review of the experience and impact of deregulation of 
the liquid fuels industries of a number of countries in order to draw lessons for the 
South African case. The South African Energy Policy White Paper states that it is 
government's intention to deregulate the downstream liquid fuels industry. It is not 
clear what the consequences will be. Hence a comparative analysis with countries 
already past this stage will be made. 
1.2 Importance of liquid fuels industry 
Consumption of liquid fuels globally is concentrated in the transport sector. Liquid 
fuels are strategically important for the modem transport systems of all countries. The 
reason for this is that there are no close substitutes yet. Therefore the sector remains 
almost totally dependent on liquid fuels. 
The contribution of liquid fuels to the economy is also valued as source of 
employment, especially in the retail sub sector. Also, there is value added in the 
production of liquid fuels. There is value added to local natural resources in the 
production of liquid fuels, usually crude, but in South Africa also to coal and natural 
gas. 
Liquid fuels can contribute significantly towards foreign earnings for the government. 
As a result governments have traditionally treated liquid fuels as strategic 
commodities whose price and distribution need to be regulated. 
1.3 Crude oil markets 
Just about all liquid fuels are manufactured from crude oil. However, two countries l , 
namely Germany and South Africa, manufacture liquid fuels from coal and natural 
gas, (lEA Energy Balances 1997). Many countries, both producers and importers of 
liquid fuels, depend largely on crude oil. The fact that crude oil is only found in certain 
1 Production of liquid fuels from natural gas in New Zealand ceased in 1994.Discussed further in Chapter 4. 
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parts of the world means that some countries have to import it for domestic refinery or 
import refined products. 
Because liquid fuels across the world are produced from crude oil, the price of most 
liquid fuels is therefore highly affected by changes in price and availability of crude oil. 
It should be noted that prices of gasoline2 and crude oil follow the same trend (see 
figure 1). The world crude oil price hike of 1990 for example is shown by the break in 
figure 1, also translated into increased prices of gasoline. The volatility of crude oil 
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2 Price of gasoline is used with the assumption that it is the major liquid fuel and can be expected to provide 
good representation of other products, diesel, jet fuel, paraffin, LPG, and fuel oiL 
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An analysis of the liquid fuels industry would therefore be incomplete without first 
looking at the crude oil industry and the developments and changes experienced over 
the past decades. A look at some properties (strategic commodity, reliability of supply) 
that characterise the oil industry and the development phases of this industry helps 
form a background against which a picture of the liquid fuels industry can be drawn. 
This is important because the changes experienced in the oil industry impact directly 
on the liquid fuels industry as shown above. 
Extremely large oil companies who have operations in exploration and production, 
refining and marketing have historically dominated the crude oil market. These 
vertically integrated companies thus have a strong influence on crude markets and 
they have shifted profits and investments between exploration and production, 
refining and marketing. Thus an understanding of the operation of crude markets is 
important 
1.3.1 Importance of oil 
The fact that large commercially exploitable oil deposits are concentrated at particular 
geographic points in the world means that these oil deposits are of strategic 
importance to every country in the world. Areas with significant proven reserves 
include the Middle East, parts of America, the Former Soviet Union, Asia, the North 
Sea and Africa. Elsewhere oil has to be imported either in its crude form or as refined 
petroleum products. 
The geographic distribution of oil reserves also has important economic implications 
for most oil-importing countries. Generally if the local market is big enough it is 
preferable for non-oil producers, on economic grounds, to import in the form of crude 
oil and refine domestically. This is because transport costs of crude oil are lower than 
costs of transporting refined products. However, it should be noted that not all 
refineries are competitive. Indeed some are uneconomicaL 
Domestic refining can be chosen for various other reasons including multiplier effects 
on other activities in the economy. Among these reasons is the attractiveness of profits 
that can be earned in the downstream activity. So domestic refining is also chosen for 
value adding reasons. It is also valued for savings through import substitution. Huge 
amounts of foreign currency that would be spent on imported products can be saved. 
3 
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In some countries oil is also important as a source of heat and power, making it an 
economically important commodity. For example, in many countries across the world 
oil is used in the production of electricity (although that is changing significantly), that 
is an important input in other sectors. Thus oil has indirect links with other sectors of 
the economy. Therefore its continued supply is vital for the stable functioning of such 
sectors. 
The importance of oil, according to Deagle (1983) is different for most exporting 
countries than it is to importers. For these exporting nations oil is a feature of national 
pride and a source of wealth. They are dependent on it for the development of their 
economies. Thus oil is valued for what it can earn host nations. They have to exchange 
it for goods with which they are relatively less endowed to ensure the growth and 
sustainability of their economies. 
1.3.2 Reliability of crude oil supply 
A reliable supply of oil is of paramount importance for the healthy functioning of 
economies. It becomes a crucial factor for energy security in countries highly 
dependent on imported oil. This raises the issue of the vulnerability of these countries 
to supply disruptions. Energy security can be defined as ensuring reliable and 
affordable supplies of energy at all times. Vulnerability refers to the potential for 
expected damage that can result from a disruption in supply. Thus the status of an 
importing country with respect to the above factors can potentially be seriously 
threatened if oil is a major source of energy. 
Measures to guard against vulnerability or reduce its effects can be devised, and 
keeping emergency stocks of oil can be one of them in the short-term measure. Lieber 
(1983) adds that even though a country may not be heavily dependent on oil imports, it 
may be vulnerable to supply shocks if protective measures are not in place. Energy 
diversification is another measure that is commonly being utilised to improve energy 
security and reduce vulnerability. 
1.3.3 Volatility of crude oil prices 
The international oil industry is generally characterised by volatile prices both of crude 
oil and liquid fuel products. Oil markets are highly exposed to political and economic 
changes that can have serious effects on the trading relationships between countries. 
Relatively small changes in the supply of oil can result in major shocks as happened in 
4 
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the 1973-74 crisis. A cutback of less than 7% in exports from OPEC countries that 
resulted in prices rising to levels more than three times higher than what they 
originally were. The next crisis in 1978-1979 was caused by less than a 4% reduction in 
supply resulting in prices increasing by 170% (Ueber, 1983:83). 
Political uncertainties concerning the supply of crude oil and the increasing demand 
for oil, in non-oil producing countries makes the problem even worse (although this is 
slowly changing). As Ueber (1983) notes, the source of supply disruption can be 
technical, economical or political. The political situation is one that is largely 
unpredictable. This is of particular concern to small importing countries who cannot 
have any influence on the world price of oil. South Africa (SA), a price taker in the 
world oil market, is one such country. 
1.3.4 Development phases of the oil industry 
It is also important also to look at the different structural changes in response to which 
the industry has evolved. These developments shed light on the events indicating the 
growth of awareness of oil as an economically and strategic commodity, and the 
involvement of governments in the industry. It is to those changes that we now turn. 
It is useful to consider the development of the international oil industry in the 
following phases: 
• The period before the first oil price shock 
• Phase I: The first price shock and consequences 
• Phase II: Second price shock and consequences 
• Phase III: Third price shock and consequences 
• Period until now 
(1) The period before the first price shock 
Since 1859, when oil was discovered, the industry has been characterised by boom and 
bust cycles. Periods of shortage would be followed by periods of surplus. In general, 
however, by the end of the first half of the 20th century, oil reserves and production far 
5 
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exceeded demand on an aggregate global basis. Despite the surplus the market was 
still subject to volatility. This was largely caused by a conflict between the desire of the 
producing countries on the one hand, concentrated on limited geographical regions, to 
maximise government revenue and the desire of oil majors, on the other hand, to 
maximise their profits. 
The period in the late 1950's was characterised by relatively stable crude oil prices. This 
was the time when largely the major international oil companies controlled the 
production and pricing of oil, and therefore liquid fuels, in a number of ways. They 
controlled profit-sharing agreements between themselves and producing states, and 
maximised total margins as far as possible. 
Governments of oil-producing nations were by then actively involved in this industry. 
Towards the end of the 1960's prices of oil were slowly moving downwards. Host 
governments were slowly getting a lower share of revenue per barrel of oil sold, 
causing dissatisfaction. The cause of dropping prices was a combination of factors, the 
most apparent being the large discoveries of new oil reserves. These discoveries led to 
overproduction despite the growing demand for crude oil and its products that was 
experienced throughout the world. This pushed prices down (Adelman et. ai. 1977 and 
Heal et. al.. 1991). 
On the other hand there were efficiency gains from the fact that major oil companies 
were able to enjoy the benefits associated with scale economies through vertical 
integration. This contributed to increased efficiency and thus reduction in production 
costs that were passed to the consumer in the form of reduced prices. Although it 
could be argued that the major oil companies restricted competition because they were 
vertically integrated and needed any competitor to enter the industry on the same 
footing, this would have been outweighed by the gains in efficiency. 
(2) The first price shock and consequences 
The beginning of 1973-1974 marked Phase I (as defined above) of development of the 
oil industry. The increased awareness of the role of the oil industry and the need for 
economic and political independence of Middle Eastern countries led to profound 
changes in control and ownership. The Libyan government, followed by governments 
of other OPEC members, emphasised the need to control the deposits of oil within 











These governments responded to the awareness by nationalising oil assets. This 
changed expectations of buyers and sellers. 
The outbreak of the Yom Kippur war in 1973 led to a reduction in the supply to oil 
markets. OPEC members controlled levels of production in their territories. They were 
anxious to maintain prices at reasonable levels by reducing production. The control 
was largely triggered, however, by the fact that governments of oil-producing 
countries were more conscious about sustaining production than the oil majors were. 
Heal, et. al. (1991) assert that, oil companies were producing at very high rates just 
before being driven away. They were doing so to maximise profits whilst they could, 
as they may have expected the government take-over. The price increased from $2.8 to 
over $10. 
Figure.2 Spot crude oil prices 
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It should be noted that up to 1973 there was a generally strong economic growth, 
coupled with high demand for energy in OECD countries. Oil represented about 46% 
of total energy consumption, of which a significant proportion was imported from the 
Middle East. 
The price rise of 1973 did not immediately lead to the adoption of strategies by 
consumers to ameliorate the effects. It took time before measures could be 
implemented to lower prices. So before any measures to reduce prices could be 
implemented, prices continued to rise steadily. 
(3) The second price shock and consequences 
Phase II between the late 1970's and early 1980's (depicted in figure 2) was 
characterised by the steep rise in prices in 1979-1981. An OPEC cartel had fully 
emerged at that period. By this time demand was growing and new oil finds were not 
large. This meant that non-OPEC producers had to increase production in order to be 
able to replace the reduced supply. However, levels of growth of production in the 
United States (USA), the largest oil consumer, were low despite the large growth of its 
economy, which had contributed to increasing reliance of supply on oil imports. This 
made counteraction by non-OPEC producers difficult, since USA was largely reliant on 
imports from OPEC countries. Concerns from consuming nations therefore about the 
depletion of oil resources grew, and oil producers, mainly OPEC members, decided to 
cut down on production through the introduction of quotas. 
By the end of 1981 governments of importing countries were active participants in the 
industry. Various methods of intervention induced by the two price hikes came into 
effect, ranging from state monopoly of oil industries to regulation of activities and the 
price of crude oil. Other countries outside the OPEC were stimulated to increase 
production so reducing dependence on imported oil from the Middle East. This in tum 
led to lowering of prices in 1982. 
Some of the measures that the importing governments took in response to price shocks 
included promoting the development and use of other energy sources produced 
domestically so reducing over-reliance on imports of oil. Some other actions taken 
were energy conservation and protection of domestic industries from international 
market pressures. Oil-producing nations, as important earners of the most part of 
government revenue were striving to make the best economic use of their resources. It 
8 
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is in this environment that the International Energy Agency (IEA) was formed, 
enforcing oil stocks of up to 90 days consumption to be kept by member countries. 
(4) The third price shock and consequences 
The late 1980's to early 1990's was the third phase. It was triggered by production cuts 
in Kuwait and Iraq during the time of war in that region. As a result, production was 
reduced by about 4.3 million bpd, a 7.6% of world oil production. Price increases in 
phase III were less severe than during the 1973 shock. The response by Saudi Arabia, 
according to Greene (1997), of increasing its production level by 3 million bpd played a 
significant role in reducing this effect and led to a real production cut of 1.3 million 
bpd. In addition, the measures taken after the 1979 shock were fully in place causing 
little disruption to supply. 
(5) The period until now 
Oil-consuming countries are no longer as dependent on Middle Eastern oil as was the 
case in the 1970's. Since then there have been discoveries of oil in other parts of the 
world and other energy sources have been utilised. One of the important 
developments is the fading away of the cold war that prevailed between the various oil 
producing, and consuming nations, improving trade relations. 
Crude oil prices were relatively stable from 1992 to 1997, ranging between $14 and $19 
per barrel. Prices in 1998 dropped to around $10 before rising to high levels, around 
$23 per barrel in 1999. 
It is interesting to note the impact of the manipulation of production levels by OPEC 
members in the second quarter of 1999 on the world oil prices. In an attempt to raise 
the crude prices, OPEC called on its members to reduce the supply of oil to the world 
markets by 1.7 million bpd (Business Day: 18/05/99). Whether this turns out to be 
another phase is yet to be seen. 
1.4 Development of SA liquid fuels industry 
The developments in the oil industry highlighted above affected energy economies and 
liquid fuels industries of various countries in different ways. How the economy is 
exposed to international markets, liquid fuels industry regulatory framework, and 
whether the economy is highly dependent on imported products are expected to have 
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been the determining factors to the extent of disruptions. The situation in South Africa 
was also partly shaped by these changes and will be discussed within this framework 
as follows. 
The SA government became involved in the liquid fuels industry in 1931. The intention 
was to prevent the formation of cartels and to ensure the continued supply of fuels and 
stability of this important industry. Unti11954 SA imported all liquid fuel consumed in 
the country in refined form. The only marketers and distributors operating in the 
country were Caltex, BP, Shell and Mobil. 
With the growth of demand for liquid fuels, it proved viable to establish a local 
refinery, and Genref (Durban) was established by Mobil company in 1954 (DMEA, 
1993). Sap ref (Durban) was the second refinery opened in 1964 by Shell and BP, 
followed by Calref (Cape Town) of Caltex in 1966 and then Natref (Sasolburg) by Sasol 
and Total in 1971/72. 
The current SA crude-refining capacity, taking account of recent de-mothballing3, is 
455 000 barrels per day. A breakdown according to refinery capacity before (1992) and 
after de-mothballing (1997) is shown in Table.1. There was an overall increase of 
refineries' capacity of 137 000 bpd by 1997, with Calref having doubled its capacity. 
3 SA refineries were required to mothball their capacities during the years of apartheid to fully accommodate 




Table. 1 ~of;ilt:ilY capacity ('000 bpd4) 
Refinery 1992 1997 
('000) ('000) 
Sapref 120 165 ! 




Natref I 78 85 
Total 318 455 
Source: SAPIA, 1998 
Currently there are nine companies involved ,in the. marketing and distribution of 
liquid fuels around the country, namely; Afric OU, BP, Caltex, Engen, Exel, Shell, 
Tepco, Total and Zenex. The import ports and production facilities are unevenly 
distributed across the country. This requires co-operative arrangements to be made 
among different companies in order to be able to distribute products around the 
country in the most efficient way. Companies therefore exchange products in the 
various regions where they are not physically represented to avoid duplication of 
facilities and functions. Transport and depot facilities are shared among all companies. 
1.4.1 Supply of crude oil and refined products 
SA does not have significant commercially exploitable reserves (current production is 
18 000 bpd crude). Almost all crude oil is imported. The Strategic Fuel Fund, a 
subsidiary of the state owned Central Energy Fund, was responsible for the 
procurement of crude oil for resale to SA refineries when the UN oil embargo against 
apartheid SA was intensified. 
Crude oil refineries are situated at the Cape Town and Durban ports, and in Gauteng, 
pipelines from Durban connect to the Natref refinery. The oil companies are 
responsible now for negotiating and arranging with their suppliers to import crude oil. 
These refineries import mainly crude oil since the importation of refined products is 
only allowed on permit. 
4 barrels per day 
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1.4.2 Synthetic fuels industry 
A synthetic fuels industry was established in South Africa in 1954. This was done for 
political, strategic, and economic reasons. When it was largely believed that world oil 
reserves were being depleted, together with threats of oil sanctions towards SA, the 
government embarked on a synthetic fuel programme with the first Fischer-Tropsch 
equipment, producing oil from indigenous coal tested at Sasol I in 1955. 
When the international oil crisis of 1973 set in, resulting in oil prices rising from US 
$2.80 to US $10.41 per barrel (BP Statistics, 1997), the government took the decision to 
expand local production of synfuels. As a result of that Sasol II was commissioned in 
1980. By then pressure of UN sanctions against SA was mounting, with Iranian 
government cutting its supplies of oil to SA. 
The third phase of the oil industry development as discussed in section 1.3.2, when oil 
prices rose from US $13.03 to US $29.75 per barrel resulted in yet another decision to 
expand Sasol, and the third plant Sasol III started operating in 1982. The government of 
the day realised the need to make up for the loss of Iranian supplies, reinforcing the 
expansion of Sasol. The establishment of Sasol III enabled the government to attain the 
target level of self-sufficiency in liquid fuels (in particular petrol and diesel) of 40%. 
The overall Sasol synthetic fuels capacity is currently 150 000 bpd of crude oil 
equivalent. Its products include petrol, diesel, paraffin, LPG and chemical feed stocks. 
Trollip (1996) notes that Sasol produces a higher proportion of the light fuels than the 
conventional refineries. Sasol, being previously state owned until 1979, enjoyed 
preferential treatment. It still qualifies for a subsidy from the government and oil 
companies are obliged to distribute its output. 
In 1991 Mossgas, converting natural gas to oil was established to increase the supply of 
synthetic fuels. The demand for liquid fuels was increasing and it was estimated that 
by the mid 1990's the level of self-sufficiency would have dropped to 30%. To retain 
the self-sufficiency ratio at the desired level therefore meant that ways of increasing the 
supply of local production of synthetic fuels had to be devised, and hence, Mossgas 
was established. It meets about 8% (45 000 bpd of crude oil equivalent) of total liquid 
fuels demand. Thus about 38% of local demand for refined products is currently met 
by synfuels with Sasol contributing 30%. The remaining 62% is met through imports of 









1.4.3 Demand for products 
South Africa consumes about 20 billion litres of liquid fuels per year. Major products 
are petrol, diesel, paraffin, jet fuel, and LPG. Petrol represents a dominant share in 
terms of demand (Sapia, 1998). Petrol versus diesel consumption is shown in figure 3. 
Petrol, as noted, has the highest level of consumption and growth in all the years 
considered. Despite this, diesel is priced relatively high through the SA pricing 
formula. This is unusual and, in fact, contrary to what one would have expected. That 
is, one would expect a higher price for petrol due to its high demand, in order to 
balance supply and demand. 






1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Years 
Source: SAPIA 1998 
Many countries price diesel lower than petrol in trying to promote the use of diesel. 
The technological advances offered by diesel engines for various applications have 
been some of the aspects taken into consideration by these governments in their 
attempts to encourage increased use of diesel (Trollip, 1996). However, South Africa 
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has chosen to be an exception to this rule. As a result consumption of diesel has been 
relatively constant and lower than that of petrol. 
The predominance of high growth in petrol demand can be traced back to growth of 
the minibus taxi industry using largely petrol as its fuel. A slight increase in diesel 
consumption is observed just after 1994. Overall demand for liquid fuels is noted to 
have increased in 1997 by 2.2%. It is the use of jet fuel that has shown significant 
increase since mid 1990's. Sapia (1998) attribute this to re incorporation of SA into the 
international community, with 11 % growth in 1997. 
1.4.4 Oil industry regulation in SA 
The main regulatory measures involve import control of refined products, price control 
of petroleum products, upliftment of Sasol and Mossgas products and restricted entry 
to retailing (Rationalisation Plan). Each of these will be discussed below. 
SA was not immune to international events. The oil industry in SA has since 1931 been 
characterised by a high level of state intervention and complex regulations: from 
procurement of crude oil (although that is now left in the hands of the oil companies)! 
to refining and marketing. The Strategic Fuel Fund was established to acquire and 
maintain strategic fuel crude oil stockpiles for resale to refineries. In 1994 the 
government approved a strategic level equivalent to four months of petroleum 
requirement (Trollip, 1996). 
Oil companies were forced to contribute towards the costs arising from the build-up of 
reserves, in return for a franchise afforded to them to build or expand their refineries. 
So the government had to use compulsion and incentive to force oil companies to 
comply. Hengeveld, et. al. (1995) note that threats of nationalisation of shareholdings in 
refineries, so that parent oil companies could guarantee their continued supply of oil to 
the country were used. 
It is interesting to note that even before crude oil sourcing was deregulated in 1991, 
when SFF was largely thought to be the only body importing crude, Shell and Total 
(SA) were exceptions. They obtained their crude from the parent companies 
(Hengeveld, et. aI., 1995: 21). This sheds light on the secrecy that prevailed in the 
industry during oil sanctions. The secrecy was made possible by secrecy legislation, 
which governed the industry during the years of oil sanctions. 
14 
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1.4.4.1 Import and Export control 
Importation of refined products is only allowed by special permit in order to ensure 
full utilisation of crude refineries. This had the added function of being an incentive to 
keep the major oil companies in the country during apartheid years. Also, it was done 
to promote and protect the government's investments in synthetic fuels. 
In addition, the government could not afford losing the added value component 
provided by refineries. The refineries are valued for their significant contribution to the 
country's Gross Domestic Product, estimated at R 1.4 billion on an annual R 10.46 
billion turnover (Sapia, 1999). Refineries also had to be kept in the country in order to 
reduce foreign exchange requirement and provide jobs. 
The conviction that should imports be allowed, other non- industry groups (like 
hypermarkets) would enter the market, reinforced the decision on import controL It 
was felt, that allowing imports of products would disadvantage consumers and the 
industry in the long run and result in sporadic dumping into the local market (DME, 
1993). Export is permitted provided SA and other South African Customs Union 
members' needs are met and permits are required for that (Trollip, 1996). 
1.4.4.2 Price control 
The wholesale and retail price of petrol is controlled by the government. The final price 
of the product is based on import parity plus other charges including tax and transport 
costs. Import parity pricing is thought to be a way of forcing domestic refineries to 
operate to internationally efficient and cost-effective standards. (This pricing principle 
is based on the idea that prices in SA should be influenced by supply of and demand 
for liquid fuels in the international markets in particular, those from which SA would 
have to get its supplies). These controls, as the Competition Board notes, guarantee the 
oil companies a fixed return (1994). The control of the retail price of petrol is one of the 
cornerstones of the regulatory system in the liquid fuels industry (DME, 1998). 
The import parity price, sometimes called the In Bond Landed Cost (IBCL) comprises 
the basis of petroleum products price. It is formed by adding the average free on board 
(fob) petrol price listed by a proportion of 80:20 refineries in Singapore and Bahrain, 
plus freight, insurance and ocean leakage costs. The freight costs are determined by 
standard international tariffs for transport journeys on a monthly basis, from 
Singapore to SA ports. Landing and wharfage charges are then added and thus the 
15 
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IDLe is arrived at. Singapore is chosen as the basis for this calculation because it is 
thought to be the most relevant site to consider. It is considered as such because it gets 
its crude oil from the same area as SA. It is also situated at more or less the same 
distance from SA as the Gulf refineries from which SA would have to get supplies of 
liquid fuels. Bahrian prices are also used for comparison purposes (DME, 1993). Added 
to the IDLC are transport costs (determined by the notional and actual cost of 
transporting products from coasts to inland) and service differential- (calculated as 
previous years' real historic costs for the whole industry and averaged country- wide). 
1.4.4.3 Service Station Rationalisation plan 
The Service Station Rationalisation Plan (RA TPLAN) is an agreement between the 
government and oil companies to control the number of service stations, and prevents 
self-service at filling stations to safeguard the jobs of petrol attendants. Wholesalers are 
not allowed to operate service stations except for training purposes. Reasons for this 
include promotion of small business development and prevention of vertical 
integration. 
Through the RA TPLAN agreement, supermarkets and hypermarkets are not allowed 
to sell petrol at prices below the controlled price. This makes dealers the largest owners 
of national networks (58%) where wholesalers contract with dealers to sell their 
products. On the other hand oil companies can lease a service station and about 29% of 
them fall under this category (Kotze, 1995). The RATPLAN determines the maximum 
number of closures of service stations by a company. 
1.4.4.4 Upliftment of synfuels 
This situation is unique to SA. With the construction of Sasol, an agreement was 
formed with the oil companies in which they had to uplift all Sasol's products. Sasol 
would not have dedicated service stations, but, was allowed a sales pump in each 
service station within a particular area (Trollip, 1996). Sasol has now given notice, 
effective from 01-01-1999 to 31-12-2003, that it intends entering the retail market 
(Business Day, 17/02/99). Mossgas receives compensation from the government for 
the difference in the price of its products and the import parity price. 
From 1989 to 1991 some of the country's refining capacity was mothballed to 
accommodate synthetic fuels production. This was done through an agreement to 
compensate companies for the loss of under-utilised capacity. Companies were forced 
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to mothball refineries because it proved more difficult for synthetic fuel plants to adjust 
their proportions of output in response to changes in market demand (Hengeveld, et. 
aI, 1995). This shows how the government's desire to be secure in oil supplies led to the 
objective of energy security overriding even economic considerations. 
The arrangements for oil supply in the face of the embargo cost the government more 
than R22b than it would normally have spent in the absence of an embargo 
(Hengeveld, et. ai., 1995). Sasol and Mossgas contribute 190 bpd of crude equivalents to 
the country's refining capacity. Their contribution had been stable at this level, 
testimony to the commitment of the government to fully utilise their output, which 
warranted mothballing of conventional refineries noted before. 
1.5 Deregulation 
The changed political and economic situation in SA, with the lifting of the oil embargo 
and our re- integration into the world economy, has led to consideration of 
institutional and regulatory reforms in the petroleum industry. Deregulation of the 
petroleum sector is the envisaged policy, to effect this change, and will be the concern 
of this study. It can be defined as the process of altering the set of rules that structure 
economic activity, and changing or removing institutions that implement them 
(Frischtek, 1992). The new government is committed to see this process through, 
provided some milestones are achieved (as detailed in the SA Energy Policy White 
Paper (1998». Among these is the attainment of a 25% Black Economic Empowerment 
within this sector. 
The implementation of deregulation is intended to take place in a series of three steps: 
firstly, arrangements are to be put in place to ensure that job - losses are minimised 
during the implementation process, and to give the government a chance to restructure 
its assets in the industry. Secondly, prices are to be allowed to be set by the market and, 
finally any distortions that arise with deregulation are to be monitored and corrected 
(SA Energy Policy White Paper, 1998). It is worth mentioning that SA does not have 
experience regarding the issue of deregulation. Reliance will be placed on international 
lessons to provide a solid foundation on which SA can draw its deregulation policy. 
Therefore the steps taken in implementing deregulation in other countries and what 
was involved will be closely studied. 
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1.6 Problem statement 
The SA industry was largely shaped by the policies of the apartheid government; self-
sufficiency in the face of the UN embargo against SA. A complicated set of regulations 
and agreements were made possible by the secrecy that governed the industry. The 
economic and political environment, however, have changed. The government has 
recognised this and set a path for changing the existing regulatory framework, as 
detailed in the Energy Policy White Paper. 
The envisaged policy is one of minimum government intervention with the ultimate 
goal of deregulating the industry. The possible effects that deregulation could have on 
the economy (for example, price, jobs, and economic participation) will be investigated. 
1.7 Research questions 
This study intends to investigate what the pattern of deregulation was in other 
countries and to what extent this is applicable to SA with regard to: 
• Impact on prices 
Deregulation is supposed to bring about lower prices. It should however be 
pointed out that this may not always be the case. An analysiS of the possible effects 
will then be made. Whether the intended recipients reap the benefits will be an 
important question this study will attempt to answer. 
• Jobs 
Deregulation will possibly have a related effect of leading to the phasing out of the 
RATPLAN (which forbids vertical integration by refusing oil companies operation 
of service stations). The concern here is whether deregulation with the subsequent 
phasing out of the RATPLAN will not result in labour layoffs. 
• Economic participation in the industry by different participants 
When deregulation happens, will the result be increased competition or collusion 
by oil companies already in the industry such a result would make it even more 
difficult for new companies to enter the market. 
Where the idea of redistribution of wealth is so sensitive and important as in SA, 
deregulation might not accelerate the process of wealth-transfer to historically 
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disadvantaged groups. Frishtek (1992) warns that deregulation does not necessarily 
provide equitable distribution. The likely effects of deregulation with regard to 
redistribution of wealth will be in SA will be examined. 
This review will also try to determine the extent to which deregulation will enable 
the development of small local business. It will examine what the impact on 
marginal and rural service stations might be. and what measures could be 
employed to ameliorate these. 
1.8 Thesis outline 
In chapter two, an analysis of some theoretical underpinnings of regulation and 
deregulation is made, followed in chapter three by a review of the experiences of the 
different countries who have liberalised their petroleum sectors. Chapter four is an in-
depth discussion of the Australian and New Zealand case studies from which lessons 
for South Africa can be learnt. 
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2. REGULATION AND DE-REGULATION: SOME 
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
This chapter briefly examines the theoretical ideal of the free market. It should deliver 
optimum allocation and distribution in the economy. However, it is pointed out that 
the free market is an "ideal" that is not achieved in practice. However, the liberalised 
market achieved via deregulation and imposition of other regulations, can achieve 
some of the goals of a free market. Having looked at some properties characterising the 
international oil industry and the background of the SA industry, a review of some 
regulatory measures applied by the state in the oil sector will follow. Here I will try to 
shed some light on the various forms of and motives driving regulation and or 
deregulation. 
2.1 The market 
The forms of ownership and control over oil companies have developed differently 
over time. Presently the trend seems to be towards market competition where there is a 
minimum government intervention. As noted, this is not a new phenomenon in 
economic history. What follows is a review of some of the underlying theory justifying 
this trend. 
The preference for an open market involving competing private enterprises stems from 
the belief that this type of organisation will lead to an efficient allocation of resources. 
The reasoning is that private individuals would, in trying to satisfy their interests, 
satisfy the public interest and objectives (Stiglitz, 1988). Here public interests are served 
when individuals seek to satisfy their individual interest. This is also justified on the 
premise that members of the society are ready to pay for anything they desire, so that 
there can be no likelihood of goods being overproduced or under-produced. Sellers act 
on signals sent by consumers, and produce just what is needed in the market. 
Producers are in search for better opportunities to increase profits. This search for 
profits ends up being a search for better, more efficient means of production, that also 
benefit the consumer, driving out of business inefficient producers. The belief that 
competition will induce efficiency and spur innovation is central to this ideology. 
The above argument is based on the fundamental theory of Pareto efficient allocation 
of resources. This states that in a Pareto optimal situation there can be no re-allocation 
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of resources where someone is made better off without making someone else worse off. 
Secondly, that re-allocation can only be achieved if the right allocation of resources was 
made from the begiIming. This means that, if the initial allocation is found to be 
unsatisfactory, redistribution is all that is needed to let market force adjust to changes. 
The main principle of these theorems is that consumers, in deciding whether to buy a 
commodity and how much, search for a quantity at which the price they have to pay 
just equals the extra benefit derived from consuming an extra unit. 
That is, they equate the additional benefit of consuming an extra unit with the 
marginal cost. The same applies to the producer. Production will continue until the 
marginal cost of producing an additional unit is equal to the extra benefit derived. 
Threat of competition forces producers to remain efficient by continuing the search for 
profitable opportunities in order to protect their market shares. 
However, the theoretical ideal is seldom achieved. In practice markets are imperfect 
and governments have often been impelled to intervene. 
2.2 Justification for government involvement 
The justification for government involvement in industry affairs arises out of the 
failure of market forces to address imbalances in the market place. The reasons cited 
for this may be economic, political, social or a combination of these. Some of the 
common justifications are failure of the market to deal with monopoly, supply of 
public goods, externalities, paternalism/ merit goods, insufficient information, links to 
other industries and socio-economic goals, development of local natural resources, 
strategic and security reasons. Each of these will be discussed below. 
2.2.1 Monopoly/oligopoly 
The term monopoly refers to a single supplier serving the market. A natural monopoly 
occurs where only one supplier in a market can efficiently provide the goods/ services 
because of its increasing returns to scale (that is, the marginal costs of production 
decline as output increases). A monopoly is regarded as problematic because a 
monopolist can restrict output and charge a higher price than would be the case in a 
competitive market. For a monopolist the marginal revenue is lower than the selling 
price. In other words for sales to increase, prices must rise. Thus the market power 
enjoyed by a monopolist may lead to the monopolist producing at a higher price than 
is economically optimal. 
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Although in the case of a natural monopolist the primary objective is the one already 
mentioned, closely associated are concerns about the distribution of income (Jaccard, 
1995). Thus it is often felt that a natural monopoly usually should be government 
owned or regulated. One of the reasons for that is that the government is thought to 
promote the interests of its citizens. Secondly, regulation of a public monopoly is 
expected to be less costly in terms of access to information than regulating a private 
monopoly company. In the SA case for example there is public monopoly of ownership 
of the oil pipelines by Transnet subsidiary. 
Major oil producers, by virtue of their near monopolistic power over the oil markets or 
their ability to collude over production decisions, can reap very high rewards by 
exploiting consuming nations. The OPEC cartel has proved capable of that practice in 
the 1970's and there is no guarantee that it cannot be repeated. Thus collusion is 
another practice which concerns governments, because it can yield similar effects to 
those of monopolies. In fact, Greene (1997: 7) identifies OPEC as an imperfect 
monopolistic cartel of the von Stackelberg type. 
The price that maximises profit for this type of cartel is determined by the price 
elasticity of demand, the cartel's share of the market and the supply response of other 
producers outside of the cartel. If the other producers respond to the cartel's 
production cuts by increasing their production with equal amounts, the price does not 
change. The situation of the OPEC cartel in the 1970's appears to conform very closely 
to the classic characteristics of producer cartels. Five objective conditions have been 
identified as the most important for a successful cartel: high concentration of 
production, high barriers to entry, small number of significant outside producers, non-
-substitutability, and non-differentiation (Spar, 1994). The situation, however, has now 
changed. 
The oil companies dominating the international oil and products markets are vertically 
integrated. That is, they are involved in all the stages of the supply chain, from 
exploration to distribution and retailing. They are in a position to exercise market 
power and cause all the disadvantages associated with this. With such conditions in 
the market then, government involvement may be warranted to ensure that necessary 
precautions are taken to safeguard the economy against market power. In various 
countries, vertical integration is prohibited to avoid the abuse of power by these 
companies. Government interference can be justified on these grounds. 
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2.2.2 Public goods 
A public good is characterised by two characteristics: one is non-exclusivity (it is 
difficult or impossible to exclude certain individuals from enjoying a public 
commodity). The second characteristic is non-rivalry (an extra individual enjoying the 
benefits of a good does not cause price of a commodity to increase, or does not 
diminish the quantity available for others) (Stiglitz, 1988). Because of these properties, 
public goods will either be supplied in insufficient quantities or not supplied by the 
market. A private investor, when undertaking a decision to invest in the production of 
goods and/or services expects a reward in the form of enough profit, to cover the costs 
of production. If the market does not allow full appropriation of the rewards, such 
goods will not provided, as the producer may simply withdraw from the market. 
Judging from the definition given in section 1.2.2.2, oil on its own is not public 
commodity. This may be confusing when a deeper look is taken at the role of the oil 
industry in economies. Since it is of significance to certain sectors that largely 
contribute to the supply of public goods, one is tempted to treat it as a public good. 
Proponents of public theory would insist that government interference is warranted. 
That is not the case. Provision of public goods should not be confused with social 
equity arguments. 
2.2.3 Externalities 
These are actions of firms or individuals imposing costs on or bestowing benefits on 
others, but not compensating those affected. An externality may either be positive or 
negative. A positive externality is when a firm/individual confers a benefit on others 
but does not receive compensation for that. A negative one is imposing costs on others, 
and not compensating them for that. In the petroleum industry, refining imposes a cost 
on communities nearby by polluting the air and not compensating those communities 
for the loss of clean, fresh air. In that case, a refiner imposes a negative externality on 
communities. 
Negative externality-causing activities, related to petroleum product production and 
usage, are enormous because the use of oil is highly associated with environmental 
degradation and subsequent health problems. The combustion of oil results in the 
emission of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide, all 
of which can be harmful. Sources of these emissions are mainly power stations burning 
oil for electricity generation, the refineries, and the transport sector from its use of 
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petroleum to fuel vehicles. Also, production, transport and storage of crude and its 
products can cause huge damage to the environment. 
Continued exposure to polluted air has been associated with bronchial problems in 
human beings. The greenhouse effect, a result of carbon dioxide emissions building up 
in the air, has become a major concern in many parts of the world. 
The petroleum industry produces negative externalities from production to final 
consumption. There are steps being taken to force the industry to take account of the 
externalities. For example, setting of pollution standards to control production of 
externalities, compensation and disincentives aimed at reducing negative externalities 
are some measures taken in this regard. Therefore, on these grounds the government 
should intervene. Transferring this function to the private sector or to an independent 
body cannot be expected to do justice as regulators are subject to capture and, among 
other reasons, are not expected as the government is to be concerned with the interests 
of citizens. 
Those involved in positive externality activities, on the other hand, may be 
discouraged from producing more of the externality-generating services since they are 
not fully rewarded. The result can be a shortage of those goods. In the presence of 
externalities therefore, Stiglitz (1988) also contends, the allocation of resources 
provided by markets may not be efficient and governments may need to intervene. 
2.2.4 Inadequate information 
Inadequate information provided to consumers about conditions and products 
available in the market can cause markets to be ineffective. Sufficient information is 
necessary to allow proper evaluation by market participants of competing products. It 
is also important to potential market entrants to assess the conditions of the market in 
respect to opportunities available and other dynamics of the market. Public sector 
supporters will argue that the private sector will not provide enough of that 
informa tion,. 
An important point to be considered about this kind of information is that it is not 
readily available and therefore is costly to obtain. Information cannot to be considered 
a free commodity, it has to be paid for and can be very expensive if supplied by the 
private sector. Added to this, it exhibits public commodity characteristics of non-
rivalry and non-exclusivity. The private sector can deliberately hide important 
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information from the public about market conditions and the costs of production in 
order to charge very high prices. The goods may in the end be under-produced. Since 
the government has the power to compel, private companies can be forced to disclose 
the necessary information. This can also be an argument reinforcing the role of the 
government. 
2.2.5 Paternalism/Patronage 
The idea that the government knows best about what is good for individuals is used as 
justification for government involvement. According to the proponents of this idea, 
even if adequate information is available to facilitate informed decisions, notes Stiglitz 
(1988), consumers may not be in a position to analyse it correctly. For example, the 
government can enforce oil companies to supply products conforming to certain 
standards of quality deemed necessary by the government to protect consumers. 
2.2.6 Protection of domestic industry 
The intention for the government to interfere may also be to protect the domestic 
industry from dumping by foreign countries. This may squeeze out local business by 
increasing the supply of lower priced, poor quality products, which have been rejected 
in their domestic markets. The government of SA, for instance supported a policy of 
self-sufficiency until the 1980's that in some ways supported this goal. This may also 
seem to support the objective of providing adequate information to the market, and 
paternalism. 
2.2.7 Rent from natural resources 
There is also a goal of receiving rent from natural resources, some of which could not 
be fully realised without government intervention. This is also to prevent exploitation 
by other companies from making use of the country's resources without adequately 
compensating the host country. 
2.2.8 Links to other industries 
The provision of certain goods is essential for the continued survival of certain 
industries within the economy. In order therefore to maintain the link between the 
relevant industries the government may need to be involved. For example, 
petrochemicals and liquid fuels can be a case in this regard. 
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2.2.9 Sodo-economic development 
Governments have various objectives to be achieved by using different policy 
instruments. In trying to do that co-operation between government sectors becomes 
relevant. In the case of supplying liquid fuels, the broader objective is provision of 
fuels across the country at affordable prices. What is likely to happen in most cases is 
that fuel can be supplied throughout the country but that prices may not be uniform if 
commercial prices are charged. A higher price would be charged for consumers far 
from production / supply centres, (usually rural areas) in order to reflect distribution 
and transport costs. On social grounds it may be felt that those consumers should be 
subsidised by their counterparts in urban centres. (See also fiscal measures 2.3.3). 
2.3 Forms of intervention 
The government has various forms at its disposal that it can use for intervention in the 
market. Among them are producing those goods or services identified to be 
unattractive to the private sector, to oversee and regulate activities of the private sector, 
and encouraging or prohibiting production and trade. These will be analysed below. 
2.3.1 Ownership 
Active participation of government through this form has been widely used in the 
petroleum sector. Governments in some countries have been, and in others still 
continue to be, responsible for production of this form of energy or ensuring continued 
supply to consumers. This has been experienced through ownership of oil companies 
integrated throughout the supply chain and separate activities of industry where the 
companies are not integrated. The fact that oil was viewed as a strategic commodity 
that cannot be traded like any other common commodity and that it is significant to 
most countries' industries were the underlying reasons for government ownership of 
petroleum industries. 
2.3.2 Regulation 
Various regulatory measures that governments impose range from control of prices, 
regulation of monopoly/oligopoly, access to the marketl protection of industry, 
regulation of relationships between refineries, wholesalers and retailers, to public 
service obligations, quotas, import / export control technical, health, environment and 
safety. Each of these types of regulation will be discussed below: 
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Price controls 
With price controls, prices of crude and products are in this case not set by the market. 
The government may set limits in terms of the floor price and ceiling within which 
prices are allowed to vary. Various components of the build-up of the final price may 
thus have nothing to do with the costs of production, as will be seen under taxation 
below. Controls can be set at any component of the activity of the supply chain, be it 
the refinery gate price, the wholesale price or retaiL 
The purpose of this is to protect consumers from monopoly / oligopoly abuse. These 
are some of the market failures noted as reasons for government intervention in the 
industry. The fear is that a monopoly/oligopoly will abuse its market power leading to 
inefficient use of resources. Another objective of regulating these types of market 
structure is to introduce free and fair competition. This involves encouraging 
participation by a number of parties including small businesses. 
In SA an additional reason for this was to keep international companies in the country 
during the apartheid era. When the UN embargo was effected international companies 
disinvested from SA, and the government had to use incentive measures, by way of 
guaranteed margins, to keep some in the country. 
Trade restrictions 
Restriction of trade is a form of regulation that can be used to protect an industry. It 
may be necessary for the development of local industry. The need to protect a local 
industry could arise from the fact that it may not have reached full development, 
making its competition with already established companies unfair. Another reason for 
this could be that the industry is promoted in order to utilise a local natural resource to 
reduce over-reliance on imported materials. Commercial competitiveness with the 
imported product may take a long time to achieve, as it may be the first time the 
technology required for operation is used. 
The production of liquid fuels from synthetics can be viewed as an industry that needs 
government protection. The technology for their production is not widely used. 
Synthetic liquid fuels have to compete or supplement liquid fuels from crude oil which 
are traded internationally. This can pose a threat to a local industry that may not have 
reached commercially competitive stages. 
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The economic consideration of local industry's contribution to the economy is another 
reason for protection. Although this does raise a lot of questions regarding the cost of 
protecting the industry, it is a factor that could support government intervention. 
Operating relationships 
The major purpose of this is to promote free and fair competition in the industry. For 
example it can ensure that there is no discrimination by a supplier among different 
customers. Also the government may choose to regulate the operating relationships 
between refiners, wholesalers and retailers in order to limit vertical integration in the 
liquid fuels industry. For example, government may oversee contractual agreements 
giving refiners or wholesalers some form of control over activities downstream. This 
could also be a way of guarding against unfair competition because, if vertical 
integration is allowed, independent small business may not be able to participate in the 
industry. Any potential competitor will be required to enter in a vertically integrated 
manner to make any meaningful contribution (discussed further in 2.6.3). 
Standards of operation 
Operating standards may be regulated to ensure that a number of objectives are 
satisfied. Such operation standards usually relate to safety. Government may set 
uniform standards regarding the construction and operation of service stations in 
terms of size, location and materials used. This will ensure the safety of motorists, and 
the general public from dangerous operations service station operators might engage 
in. 
Labour regulation 
An economic factor can also be a point under consideration. Prevention of self-service 
in order to safeguard jobs of petrol attendants can be enforced through this form of 
regulation. 
General mergers and acquisitions regulation 
This is supportive of the general principle of promoting free and fair competition in 
the industry. It regulates formation of mergers and acquisitions by setting guidelines 
regarding acceptable conditions of mergers that will not lead to violation of general 
competition principles. Acquisitions that, for example, result in the acquiring company 
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gaining a certain share of the market that is regarded big enough to exercise unfair 
market power can be prevented through this form of regulation. 
2.3.3 Fiscal measures 
These include taxes, grants and subsidies. The stage of production at which any of 
these is applied can vary depending on the objective they are intended to achieve. 
Taxes can, for example, be used to reduce demand for a certain product, in order to 
promote consumption of another product or as a way of promoting energy efficiency 
in production and use. Currently some countries are taxing leaded and unleaded petrol 
differently, with leaded priced higher to promote the use of unleaded petrol. Also 
there might be a differential between diesel and petrol to encourage increased use of 
diesel. 
Taxes are also used to force users of oil and its products to take responsibility for their 
externality-causing activities, as noted above. Taxes are mostly, however, designed to 
earn governments revenue (lEA, 1996). 
Subsidies are to a large extent used to equate prices charged to consumers at different 
localities. The main target is mainly consumers in the rural parts of the country who, 
because of low demand or poor infrastructure, are not profitable to supply. 
2.3.4 Trade instruments 
Falling under this category are tariffs, quotas, exports I imports embargoes. Quota 
(regulating quantity) systems have been used in to regulate major petroleum products 
for a long time. 
Tariffs may be used to discourage imports with the aim of promoting local business or, 
alternatively together with quotas, to encourage trade, respectively. 
Trade embargoes are used for political reasons mainly (as was the case with the 
embargo by the US against Iraq, and the UN embargo against the apartheid South 
Africa). 
2.3.5 Research and Development 
The emphasis on Research and Development (R&D) funded by the government varies 
across different energy sources and countries. The lEA (1996) notes that the amount 
spent on R&D for oil and coal issues together constituted 11% of total government 
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R&D expenditure in rnA countries. Support for dissemination of new technology is the 
common form of intervention. This is done to create public awareness about a new 
technology in the market thus assisting suppliers to make it commercially viable. 
R&D are in some way a public commodity. Knowledge gained through R&D does not 
diminish by sharing it with others. That is, there is the characteristic of non-rivalry. 
Also once a technology is in the market, other producers can imitate it if not under 
patent. The support for R&D can thus be direct or indirect through the use of subsidies 
and tax incentives. 
The effectiveness of these measures is very difficult to assess as different results have 
been achieved in different situations. Rather what can be done is to look at the 
rationales for government intervention and see whether they really apply to the 
petroleum markets, first, and then analyse whether the appropriate measures have 
been used. 
The justifications for government intervention discussed above may appear conclusive 
and well thought out, but an analysis of actual experience raises some doubts about 
this. These rationales are put forward with the assumption that the government has 
proper knowledge of the market and has the best interest of its citizens. This may not 
always be the case as will be shown below. The government also has limitations. We 
tum to those. 
2.4 Government failures 
Governments are thought to be better representatives of their citizens than private 
companies, so that what is desired by the government will satisfy all the citizens. This 
had been the underlying reason for advocating high government involvement in 
certain industries, including the liquid fuels industries of various countries. This view 
is however slowly changing towards minimum government involvement. Some of the 
reasons for this are highlighted below. 
Governments have budgetary constraints within which to operate in pursuit of their 
goals. Objectives of the government are many and often contradictory. This makes 
attainment of the stated objectives very difficult for a number of reasons. 
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Government employees are individuals who have different objectives. These 
individual objectives may be in conflict with those of the government. Corruption may 
result and this in turn results in an inefficient use of resources. 
Many services supplied by the government are supplied in a manner that does not 
show the true costs to the consumer, and are often under-priced. Because of that 
individuals tend to demand provision of that particular service more than they would 
if individual consumption was tied to the price. 
In view of the above the role of government is increasingly being limited to those 
services in which there is consensus that the private sector cannot supply adequately. 
This can give the government opportunity to operate effectively without being a player 
and a referee in business. 
2.5 Drivers for liberalisation 
It was stated earlier that some of the objectives of the free market ideal can be achieved 
through liberalisation of the markets. Different situations are experienced in different 
countries that lead to the desire to liberalise the markets. The general performance of 
petroleum sectors under heavy ownership of governments has had mixed results. Of 
the bad ones, mention can be made of investment decisions that have been made 
haphazardly without any due concern for long term implications. Some have largely 
been politically driven. The result has been misallocation of resources that could have 
been used efficiently within the sector. 
2.5.1 Inefficiency and lack of commercial objectives 
One of the main reasons for the poor performance of public companies is the result of 
lack of incentives on the part of managers to operate efficiently. One of these is the lack 
of accountability and easy access to public funds. Because of this and the fact that they 
are often not guided by business principles, the result is inefficiency in use of 
resources. The problem of a concise definition among governments of what constitutes 
public goods and how these should be priced is also often to blame for this. 
Governments in certain cases have been too industrious in providing energy for 
citizens at all costs without due consideration of the impacts. In trying to fight other 
pressures the government allocates funds to other projects away from petroleum sub 
sectors, for example promoting development of other domestic energy industries to 
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reduce reliance on oil. In the end there are not enough funds aimed at improving 
petroleum sector services and/or products by way of upgrading and expanding 
facilities to meet the growing demand of petroleum products. 
In spite of this, it should be noted that there are or have been public companies that are 
efficient. 
2.5.2 Pressure from intemationallending agencies 
Countries facing poor growth or struggling to improve economic performances are the 
most vulnerable to this kind of pressure. They are characterised by high foreign debt 
levels. Dependence on donor organisations for rescue packages therefore forces them 
to comply with the rules laid down to them by their donors. 
One of the conditions is often that in order for them to be able to raise funds and 
promote private sector investment, they are obliged to consider opening the industry 
to competitive forces. 
2.5.3 Lack of private investment 
Lack of finance to develop the petroleum sector's infrastructure meant that the 
government had to look to the private sector to provide new investments. In those 
instances, the recognition of the importance of the private sector for the development 
of the petroleum sector was the driving force. 
Also private investment means the government avoids straining the central budget and 
frees the government to perform other functions which the private sector cannot be 
trusted to do adequately. 
2.6 Forms of liberalisation 
Liberalisation of the industry can take a number of forms depending on the objectives 
underlying the decision to open up the market. In some cases it will be noticed that a 
combination of methods rather than one single way is followed. Country specifics play 
an important role in the determination of which method is applied. These involve 
privatisation, deregulation, promotion of competition, capitalisation, foreign 
investment, and trade liberalisation. A look at each one of the methods follows. 
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2.6.1 Privatisation 
Various forms have been used to reduce the hand of the state in business activities in 
the petroleum industry. One common way among previously state-owned monopoly 
companies is the privatising of those companies. Liberalisation often involves 
privatisation although this does not mean to suggest that it is a pre-condition for 
liberalisation to take place. As much as this method is followed, most of the times to 
earn revenue for the state, that is not always the reason. Transfer of ownership through 
sale of assets achieves this objective, but there are other methods of privatising without 
selling all the assets. 
A look at such different privatisation measures in a number of countries is considered 
later. The study will only be limited to the relevant types as pursued in petroleum 
industries, the motivations and what was achieved afterwards. 
Cognisance should be taken of the fact that change of ownership in these petroleum 
markets is not the ultimate goal sought by the various governments but a step towards 
the final objective of introducing competition and improving efficiency, by liberalising 
and deregulating the industry. Of utmost importance to private ownership are the 
potential benefits expected through efficiency gains accruing as a result of better set of 
incentives and constraints. Some of these potential benefits relate to providing 
consumers better service and a wider choice. 
Private companies are thought to be more sensitive and responsive to changing market 
conditions and customer needs than publicly owned ones. The benefits associated with 
a private company can largely be realised if the relevant companies operate in a 
competitive set up, otherwise they can also be inefficient. 
Competition is thought to foster innovation among companies thus promoting 
introduction of new products as a way to enhance individual company image and to 
restore and protect market share. Threat of take-over and bankruptcy drive private 
firms to be efficient. 
Privatising is also done to reduce political interference in business. It provides 
incentives to achieve both allocative (keeping prices close to marginal costs) and 
productive (achieving higher profits as a result of reducing costs and improving 
products or service) efficiency. It is worth noting, however, that the efficiency gains 
accorded to the private business are not universally agreed upon (Head, et. al., 1991). 
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2.6.1.1 Methods of privatisation 
Privatisation can be defined as transfer of ownership, operation and development from 
the state to private hands. The type of privatisation chosen will to a large extent be 
determined by the underlying objectives for privatisation. A range of objectives for 
privatisation include increasing economic efficiency by promoting and introducing 
competition, reducing public debt, freeing public funds for financing other demands, 
especially for social development. Included are methods of increasing both local and 
international private investment, and reducing the fiscal burden of running a public 
company. 
The crucial co-ordination of the method chosen with the goal, can be shown as follows: 
where the driving force for privatisation is mainly to generate cash for the government, 
transfer of ownership by direct sale of assets or business unit is the preferred type. 
Other considerations like protecting national interests however may lead to another 
choice being made. One or a combination of these measures may be chosen depending 
on the nature of the privatisation method preferred. 
Before the actual privatisation of the company takes place, restructuring the company 
is often necessary to adjust the company to commercial principles. Restructuring is a 
process of effecting changes in the operational, financial, labour and administrative 
structure of the organisation. The main purpose is to prepare the company 
commercially for the discipline of the market and put it on a par with potential 
competitors. 
In financial restructuring, functions the enterprise was performing and financing have 
to be divided into separate business units. This can facilitate the breaking down of big 
corporations that used to be diversified for other functions. 
Hence functions of the enterprise which can be commercially viable are separated from 
purely social functions. Debts incurred whilst in public hands may have to be written 
off. This is to make valuation of the enterprise simpler especially if it is considered for 
sale. 
As part of the restructuring, the company's infrastructure may need upgrading or 
expansion. This may in many cases have been the reason for restructuring. It is a 
worthwhile exercise if the government has intentions of selling it off, otherwise the 
buyer may prefer to do the changes. The UN (1995) emphasise the point that should 
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the government effect changes that are not in line with the potential investors' 
interests, this can result in big losses. Potential investors may be driven away, or the 
enterprise may be undervalued. Once the restructuring process is complete, 
privatisation may proceed. 
Commercialisation and corporatisation are also considered before the decision to 
privatise is implemented. Commercialisation is the process of bringing commercial 
objectives into the management and operation of the enterprise. It requires the 
enterprise to do away with subsidies it used to receive from the government and 
henceforth operate within a tight budget. This phase can also involve setting of 
performance goals in terms of production or quality of products. Corporatisation also 
means exposing the company to commercial principles and goes further into 
transforming the enterprise into a legal corporation, governed by the country's 
corporate act. The section under consideration or the whole enterprise becomes 
independent of the government (although the government retains ownership). This is a 
way of placing public managers on a par with private sector managers, all striving for 
the maximisation of their shareholders wealth. 
The various methods that can be followed are joint venture, direct sale, capitalisation, 
public shares, and management / employee buyout. Each of these methods will be 
looked at below. 
• Joint venture 
This is a form of working together between the government and a private partner 
(usually international) to share benefits and risks of running the enterprise. Here the 
government retains ownership. This is mostly preferred where the enterprise in 
question has to be upgraded and requires a lot of investment. A joint venture can be in 
the form of a contract. The advantage of choosing this method of privatisation is that 
both partners stand to benefit. The government will get the needed investment and 
special know-how in management. In addition, this can provide access to networks 
that can open the way to new technology and export markets. The partner, on the other 
hand, gets access to domestic markets. In countries where foreign ownership is not 
allowed, this can be the only way to enter the domestic market for an international 
partner. 
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• Direct sale 
This means direct transfer of ownership from the public to the private sector through 
sale of the public enterprise. The sale may involve the whole or part of the enterprise 
and can be effected through sale to an already identified buyer or through competitive 
bidding. The first option has many disadvantages, which can lead to the dissatisfaction 
of the public rendering the whole process unacceptable. One of the reasons for this is 
the lack of transparency and competition. The UN (1995) suggests that this method 
should be carried out only when a limited number of potential buyers with enough 
financial and managerial resources are available. This, however also raises some 
questions as to the commitment and honesty of the individuals carrying out the 
exercise and whether they can be trusted to perform that duty without prejudice in the 
selection of the buyer. Criteria used may not be clear and easy to challenge. 
Competitive bidding on the other hand introduces competition among bidders, 
offering the state a wider choice. The bidder who offers the highest price, while at the 
same time satisfying the other requirements and objectives of privatisation, can be 
selected, publicly and transparently. 
The disadvantages with bidding are that it is time consuming and involves the high 
costs of administering the bidding process. Acceptability and trust that privatisation is 
done in the public interest becomes very important. That is because privatisation of 
one enterprise can set precedence (for being accepted or rejected) for others yet to 
follow. This consideration can therefore outweigh cost- saving considerations and will 
result in an unsatisfactory outcome. 
• Public shares 
This method is used to transfer ownership of the enterprise and also to raise capital. In 
addition to that there may be the goal of increasing share ownership by allocating a 
percentage of shares to small investors. Shares of the public enterprise are offered on 
the stock market. Transparency in this method is even greater than with a direct sale. 
With this type of transaction the company is required to disclose its financial 
information and is advertised. Certain groups of the population can be targeted to 
encourage wider participation by offering shares in small units to make them 
affordable to the targeted group. 
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• Employee/management buyout 
This plan gives the management and employees of a public enterprise an opportunity 
to gain share ownership in the enterprises they work for. The advantage is a potential 
increase in productive efficiency. Since employees and management are allowed to buy 
shares, they feel they are part of the company and are motivated to find ways of 
reducing costs. Privatisation is in many situations rejected by employees who risk 
losing their jobs. 
On that basis, buy-outs can help win the support of such reluctant parties. A serious 
factor, which is likely to cancel out this opportunity for employees, is a lack of 
sufficient resources. This, needs to be evaluated before-hand to avoid reselling of the 
company once employees fail to meet payment for the shares allocated to them. 
2.6.2 Deregulation 
Liberalisation and! or deregulation of the industry are the important elements that 
have been used to introduce competition in markets. The World Development Report 
(1994) asserts that entry into activities with no technological barriers promotes 
competition in the industry. The downstream oil industry exhibits such characteristics. 
The general nature, entry barriers and structure of the oil industry indicate that it is an 
industry that can be workably competitive. 
Liberalisation and deregulation are so closely related that sometimes use of the two 
words can be confusing. In trying to clear up that confusion, liberalisation is defined as 
abolishing measures that prohibit entry into certain areas of the market, normally 
served by a monopoly firm (Waterson, 1988). Deregulation is the release from 
regulatory supervision of prices and entry into the industry. The regulatory controls 
can be on prices or measures such as restraining imports or exports of products. These 
definitions show that it is possible for a market to be liberalised without being 
deregulated. 
2.6.3 Promotion of competition by allowing new entrants 
This is largely concerned with liberalising the market where potential competitors 
were initially prohibited from participating. This still has to be followed by the 
elimination of other restraining regulations. Allowing new suppliers in a market can be 
misleading, though, as it does not necessarily ensure competition. The mere fact that a 
large number of firms are allowed to participate in the industry, does not imply a 
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competitive market. Of particular importance is the potential for other members being 
able to enter. Price or output, for example, can be determined by the government by 
limiting the actions of firms or profit margins, thus rendering the market non-
competitive regardless of the number of firms. A good example in the petroleum 
industry is that of limiting imports of refined products. That way, local firms are 
shielded from international competition. 
At the initial stages of freeing markets, benefits of competitive entry come largely from 
reaction of the firms already in the industry and less from new entrants themselves, 
because they do not cover a big share of the market right away. Waterson (1988) asserts 
that new firms gain sales from new customers and partly by attracting former 
customers of the old firms. The entrant will strive for further attraction of customers by 
improving its service and engaging in cost-reducing practices. This will give both old 
and new firms incentives to introduce new varieties. At this stage regulation that will 
prevent restraining actions from old firms driving out the new entrants may still be 
needed. This will allow new entrants to fully establish themselves in the industry 
(South Centre, 1996) in terms of experience, markets, information and all other 
characteristics surrounding the established companies. It is very important that a 
definite period, regarded to be long enough for adjustment, regarding protection of 
new entrants be agreed upon. Otherwise the whole process can end up being a change 
from supporting one group to another. 
Initial protection of entrants is suggested because the incumbent firm has an advantage 
over the new entrant for reasons mentioned above. Considering an example of an 
integrated refiner a new-comer needs to enter the industry also by vertically 
integrating which is not always possible for some. Without that the integrated firm can 
withhold its supply to the new-comer, if the new entrant operates downstream and has 
to compete with the same supplier. 
2.6.4 Foreign investment and trade liberalisation 
Lack of funds to invest in expansion and upgrading of refineries and other petroleum 
sector infrastructure has been mentioned as one of the reasons for the decision to 
liberalise the petroleum sector. In an attempt to rescue host countries' situations, the 
industries were opened to domestic and international investors. International 
investments in developing countries is being sought to accelerate the upgrading with 
the hope of gaining from the expertise such investors bring along. As a result 
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petroleum sectors consist of multinational companies (MNCs) operating in various 
supply segments. 
The same international companies have been accused of cheating host countries to the 
benefit of their home countries. Arguments that they give a false picture of growth in 
that they highly develop the small sub-sector in which they operate with little 
contribution to other sectors of the economy. 
It has been alleged that they invest in highly capital-intensive technology and 
therefore contribute very little to employment creation. It is on these grounds that the 
South Centre (1996) warns that not all foreign investments are of benefit, as it is not 
necessarily the amount of investment which matters, but the form of it. Of importance 
is the kind of links with the rest of the economy that will result from the investment. In 
the petroleum sector, the MNCs often acquire oil supplies from their mother 
companies or affiliates. It has also been alleged that they use transfer prices and 
technology agreements and send all earnings back home. In that case, argues Roland 
(1998), it is the home country that benefits. This is viewed as exploitation of the 
countries they were expected to develop. 
Developing countries are trying to attract the attention of the international companies 
to invest in the petroleum industry. The high debt and lack of expertise has forced a 
change of perception about the large oil companies, perhaps also in ways of dealing 
with them. The widespread use of licenses and joint ventures can be thought to be 
some of the strategies to guard against the old "abuse" by internationals. We now tum 
to look at different countries' experiences of liberalising the petroleum sector. 
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3.1 Liberalisation as a general economic 
phenomenon 
From after the second worldwar until the 1970's there was general growth and 
prosperity in most economies except the many developing countries in the Sub-
Saharan region. Per capita incomes and growth levels of labour productivity were at 
their highest levels in history in almost all developed nations. 
A disastrous change in the 1970's reversed many of the benefits that had been gained 
after the war. High unemployment together with high inflation rates emerged. Almost 
every country experienced a change in economic performance, with the extent and 
severity of the economic downturn differing according to individual countries' 
situations and characteristics. This was alarming and forced nations to review their 
economic policies in adjustment to the crippling situations they found themselves in 
(Roper, et. ai., 1987). These were changes affecting economies in large and specific 
sectors. The oil sector was not an exception to this. 
The major oil crises of 1973-4 associated with the OPEC~manipulated rise in oil prices 
contributed significantly to the decline of economic growth. The trade balances of oil-
importing countries deteriorated and seriously affected investors' confidence. 
Consequently governments had to devise policy reforms thought to be capable of 
withstanding such crises without detrimental effects to economic performance. 
The changes happened at a time when governments in most countries were highly 
involved in industries. However, these events led to a review of such policies, with the 
growing belief that excessive government interference and regulation in markets were 
directly responsible for the deterioration in growth rates. Calls for minimum state 
intervention became a characteristic of political statements in the 1980's. The 
desirability of government involvement in commercial areas of the economy began to 
be questioned. 
The perception that the growth of government has had harmful effects on the 
performance of industries grew, and many countries started planning and 
implementing ways of reducing public control. The process is not without difficulties 
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and obstacles. In the downstream petroleum sector most efforts were geared toward 
reducing the government's role in business by introducing competition through 
liberalisation and deregulation of petroleum markets. Changes have been proceeding 
at a very slow pace in developing countries compared with industrialised countries. 
Some of the factors seemingly driving developing countries towards liberalisation, are 
the policies of international finance institutions, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). So the liberalisation policies adopted are often not of their own 
initiative. Continued deterioration in the performance of their oil sectors though, has 
also been one of the pressures. 
Most developing countries are still contemplating or just beginning implementing 
reforms in petroleum industries. The economic performances of many developing 
countries have not been satisfactory. Because of this, one would expect these 
economies to be taking an initiating role in reforming their petroleum sectors as they 
are highly affected by the poor performance of their petroleum industries. The 
economic and political characteristics of these countries, however, seem to be holding 
them back. 
Progress has been slow. Nevertheless a few developing economies are about to reach 
their advanced stages of liberalising their petroleum industries. These stages may be 
described as advanced in the sense that they have implemented their reform plans 
fully and are in a position to review the outcomes and fully determine whether their 
policies have been successful. 
On the whole, the past two decades have brought profound changes to economies 
world-wide. The oil shocks and the resulting economic shocks reduced the perception 
of independence and striving for self-sufficiency in energy supply and promoted 
development of international trade. Developing countries are also slowly being forced 
to integrate themselves into this trend. Participation in international competition 
requires them to attract private capital to be able to upgrade and modernise to 
international standards. 
3.2 Specific country experiences 
In the petroleum industry these changes are impacting on the involvement of 
governments by way of ownership of oil companies and industry regulation. Both the 
levels and forms of intervention differ from country to country. In some countries, the 
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government is involved through the ownership and operation of the oil companies 
throughout the supply chain. From procurement of crude (in the case of oil importers) 
to storage, refining, distributing, through to wholesaling and retailing. In others, 
governments own and/or operate certain elements of the chain, and regulate most 
other activities in the industry. The main interest of this paper is in the downstream 
sub-sector. With the wave of liberalisation and deregulation, governments are trying 
different ways of freeing industries to establish competitive markets. 
The different strategies pursued range from corporatisation and privatisation, to 
liberalisation and deregulation. The procedures followed differ according to whether 
before the reforms the government had a monopoly throughout the chain, or only in 
certain activities. There were different situations in different countries and so the 
nature of the reforms followed are expected to differ according to the country's 
situation. Also, in some countries there was a mixture of public and private 
participation accompanied by state regulations. Others had the government only 
playing a regulatory role over the enterprises. 
Another aspect that is important in the analysis of the process of liberalisation is 
whether the process was a once off or a gradual step-by-step process with the 
underlying reasoning behind each step. Some countries experienced an overall reform 
from the structure (e.g. public monopoly) to the set of regulations governing the 
industry. In other countries where both public and private companies were functioning 
under strict oversight by the government, only the set of regulations had to be altered 
to be in line with the new liberalised order. 
A deeper look at each of the strategies of a number of countries follows below. The 
situation that prevailed before the reforms will briefly be laid out. Having done that, 
various motivations behind liberalisation and deregulation of these markets will be 
analysed. This will help in drawing a picture of the effects each government had in the 
industry. 
3.2.1 Bolivia 
All oil produced in the country is consumed domestically and has been enough to 
cover the country's products supply. Bolivia has for the period 1985-1992 been self-
sufficient in production of products as indicated by the absence of products' imports in 
Table 3.2.1. Small amounts of products were imported in 1992-1995. 
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Table 3.2.1 Supply of and demand for crude and products (m t) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Crude production 1.19 1.16 1.19 1.14 1.2 1.31 1.38 1.33 1.37 1.56 1.75 
Net product exports 0.02 0.01 0.Q1 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.12 -0.10 -0.09 
Product demand 0.99 1.01 1.05 1.04 1.09 1.13 1.16 1.16 1.21 1.28 1.34 
Source: Prepared from lEA Energy Balances, 1997. 
Status before liberalisation 
In Bolivia, the government had a monopoly over all activities, and set prices and 
petroleum product supply. The state-company was responsible for the production of 
over 81% of liquid fuels consumed in the country and owned all the oil pipelines and 
the refining facilities. There were two main objectives in this; firstly to maximise 
revenues collected from the petroleum industry. The second aim was the social 
responsibility to ensure continued subsidies on liquid petroleum gas (LPG). Petroleum 
products were priced uniformly throughout the country. This caused a distortion of 
prices in terms of output/price ratios of gasoline to diesel and kerosene and LPG 
ratios. 
The state-company, YPFB, had limited incentives to improve its standards of services 
such that there was a need to improve service, and quality of products to customers. 
Bolivia is suitably situated for production and transportation of petroleum products to 
its surrounding neighbours (Pacheco, 1998). The failure of the state monopoly to 
expand and make the necessary investment to take advantage of the country's regional 
position is testimony to its poor performance. 
Capitalisation 
A somewhat unusual reform compared to that of the other countries examined in this 
paper was implemented in Bolivia. This is called capitalisation. It can be said to be 
another version of privatisation, not conducted in the common manner of transferring 
a public company to private hands just to earn revenue directly for the treasury. In 
Bolivia capitalisation involved doubling the capital investment in the company. The 
would-be proceeds did not go to the government. Rather, the private owner agrees to 
re invest within an agreed period of time into the company. The new investor then 
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took administrative control of the company. The rest of the shares were used to boost a 
pension plan for the Bolivian citizens, administered by a private sector pension fund. 
The new method was focused on building the relevant sector's infrastructure and 
promoting social security by creating the pension scheme. This would increase the 
potential growth of the economy. This was applied in the upstream oil sector. Its 
unique nature sheds light on the different procedures followed in countries in 
addressing their problems. Some countries might decide to follow the same strategy 
but extend it to downstream. 
Firstly, for the process to be initiated, relevant regulatory laws were passed. This 
preceded any capitalisation. A separate department was formed to oversee and drive 
the process, as there was no other suitable department within the state. A new 
department was necessary because the capitalisation program not only affected the oil 
sector but other sectors as well. Once all legal provisions were in place, implementation 
was started in 1995. 
The process of capitalisation was undertaken in a series of steps involving 
consultations conducted in a transparent manner. The net current valuation of the 
company concerned was determined in accordance with internationally accepted 
auditing and accounting principles. In allocating the 50% share to the private owner, 
interested parties were allowed to bid. The best financial offer got the shares. It was 
after this process that the state shares were transferred to the fund. 
The state monopoly was broken into three separate entities because of the relative 
importance accorded to the oil sector, and the strong sentiments of the desire to protect 
national and economic interests. For this reason, the refined products pipeline and 
wholesale marketing remained under state ownership. 
The government of Bolivia was cautious about liberalisation of the downstream sub 
sector. There were fears that opening it can lead to substantial problems. These 
problems would concern especially the refineries, because of the small size of the 
market (Pacheco, 1998:104). However, an agreement was reached in 1999 to privatise 
the downstream sector. Consultations were held with the employees of YPFB and it 
was understood that the process would result in about 1600 employees losing their jobs 
(Energy International Administration, 1999). The process still continues. 
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3.2.2 Argentina 
Argentina has considerable reserves of oil, but for the period 1985-1995 has been 
importing crude oil. In the same period there were exports of products while small 
amounts were imported except in 1987-1988. 
Table: 3.2.2 Supply of and demand for crude and products (m t) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Crude production 24.8 23.5 23.2 23.5 24.3 25.6 25.8 30 32.1 36 38.8 
Net crude exports -26.5 -29.7 -30.5 -31.2 -28.6 -27.5 -25 -23.4 -21.3 -17.5 -11.4 
Net product exports 3.37 1.14 -1.07 -0.31 2.45 3.94 3.43 3.67 2.50 1.65 0.85 
Product demand 20.39 21.37 23.02 21.89 20.46 18.98 20.06 20.71 22.12 21.66 21.49 
Source: lEA, 1997. 
Status before liberalisation 
Before regulatory reforms in Argentina, Yacimentos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF) was a 
state-owned monopoly company operating both upstream and downstream. To 
safeguard the country from international oil disruptions the government adopted 
policies aimed at self-sufficiency. A few private companies were allowed to supply 
crude and products on a quota basis when there were shortages in local production. 
Over-staffing was high and labour unions were strong. Labour unions interfered with 
the management of the company, to the extent that the company was used in many 
instances for political rather than commercial objectives. This led to operational 
inefficiencies (Vielvoye, 1991). 
Privatisation and deregulation 
In 1985 the government of Argentina tried to open the oil industry to private 
participation. The intention was to attract foreign funds while the control of 
partnerships would remain in the hands of YPF. This attempt failed. The plans to 
privatise YPF were revived and modified in 1989 when the new government took over. 
The opening of the oil industry to competition was accomplished by reducing YPF's 
control of over the nation's oil. The main objectives were to allow companies to sell oil 
at world market prices while keeping domestic petroleum prices at levels very much 
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lower than internationally competitive market prices. The price per barrel of oil was 
approximately $8 compared to the $20 world market price (Hillman, 1995). 
The strategy was aimed at developing an export-oriented domestic market. This was 
done by increasing consumption of heavier crude for local refining thus making 
available lighter, higher value oil for export. YPF's monopoly was removed, allowing 
other companies entry into the market. Supply quotas were also removed in order to 
promote competition. Privatisation followed after trying to upgrade YPF to 
international standards, leaving the new company (YPFBA). The state held a 50% share 
in YPBA. 
The process of deregulation started in 1991 with the formulation of a program of action 
for deregulation. The program had three important elements: 
The first one is related to the reform of the state itself. This has very important 
implications for the success of any development initiative. Changes limited to the 
petroleum sector cannot be fully effective while the rest of the economy is still bound 
to the old ways of doing business. The various sectors of the economy are 
interdependent. Therefore to be able to effect improvements or failures, the rest of the 
economic environment has to be supportive of individual sector policies. 
The second step was the deregulation of the oil industry and the fostering of 
competition. Ensuring an environment conducive to competition, with the continued 
participation of YPF as a state company, was not an easy task. In fact the manager of 
YPF confessed that it was the biggest challenge they had to face (Aalund, 1995:47). All 
prospective participants in the industry, both local and international, needed to be 
ensured of a level playing field before they would consider investing in such a high-
risk industry. The main issue that had to be dealt with first was fear that YPF could 
take advantage of its big share. This meant YPF had to operate on a commercial basis, 
guided by business principles. 
Impacts of liberalisation 
YPF's legal monopoly was removed after the privatisation and deregulation of the 
petroleum market in Argentina. Currently, YPF shares the market with private 
companies through joint ventures to produce, refine, transport and market products. 
Privatisation has led to the development of an economic environment receptive to new 
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foreign business. There is fierce competition in the industry from international and 
domestic companies. 
Argentina's refining capacity is in the region of 635 000 barrels per day. Esso, YPF and 
Shell are the major refiners with 17%, 47.5% and 22% market share respectively. The 
other small refiners are Isaura with a 9.3% market share and the only one among these 
with a catalytic converter. Others are Refisan and Refinor (together with 4.2% market 
share) in which YPF still maintains a 30 % interest. (Aalund, 1995). YPF still remains 
the largest company, refining over 52% (taking also into consideration the fact that it 
holds interest in Refisan and Refinor). YPF also controls more than 54% of the retail 
distribution network. 
On this note it can be argued that market power is not a completely undesirable 
characteristic. For, a large firm may have attained its position through its operational 
efficiency thus out-competing its rivals. In this case, as YPF is competing with other 
firms, efficiency is the key to retaining its share. The size of the company need not be 
an issue. In fact, market power may even be desirable if it or the need to attain it, 
realises the highly desirable aim of giving consumers better quality products at 
reasonable prices. 
Since privatisation of YPF, Hillman (1995) notes that the petroleum industry has 
contributed significantly to reducing the inflation rate from 4.9% in 1989 to just over 
15% in 1994. The loss of 22% of jobs in YPF has had great social impacts. 
3.2.3 Brazil 
Significant quantities of crude oil in Brazil are produced domestically. However crude 
imports during 1985-1995 constituted more than half the domestic production. The 
quantities of products exported were slowly decreasing until 1991, when products' 
imports grew significantly, outstripping the quantity of products exported. The oil 
supply / demand situation is shown in Table 3.2.3. 
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Table. 3.2.3 Supply of and demand for crude and product (m t) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Crude production 37.4 38.5 38.7 37.4 39.6 41.4 42.2 41.6 42.6 44.8 46.1 
Net crude exports 
Net product exports 
Product demand 
Source: lEA, 1997. 
-27 -29.8 -30.6 -31.4 -29.2 -28.4 -26.2 -26.4 -25.7 -28 -25.1 
3.83 1.97 2.51 1.48 1.16 0.26 -1.57 -2.09 -7.76 -5.65 -8.11 
56.79 63.42 64.40 64.15 65.30 64.88 65.63 67.28 70.31 74.51 77.71 
Status before liberalisation 
Energy consumption was largely characterised by domestically produced oil. With the 
increased growth in demand for oil as a result of high industrialisation that was taking 
place, oil imports grew. The fear that this would limit the growth of the economy and 
exert pressure on the balance of payments became a serious concern. Means of 
reducing the dependence on energy imports (as coal was also mainly imported) had to 
be sought. 
It was on this basis that the state monopoly oil company, Petrobras was formed in 1954 
(de Oliveira, 1998). It was formed as a vertically integrated company, aimed at 
reducing market and political risks, and ensuring the efficient running of the oil 
industry at large. It had a monopoly almost throughout the supply chain, except at 
retailing where a number of private companies were operating. Only two small 
refineries were private. 
Petrobras was regarded as one of the state oil companies that was functioning 
satisfactorily. The efficient and competent operation of this company can 
predominantly be attributed to large economies of scale. The company had ten 
refineries and owned all terminals and oil pipelines. 
The international oil disruptions of 1973 and 1979 increased the pressure to reduce 
imports of oil as they had a large effect on Brazil's economy. The government therefore 
intensified its efforts to promote domestic production of energy substitutes for 
imported fuel. The main instruments in this campaign were the use of incentives and 
subsidies. This resulted in a decrease in the net imports of crude oil and petroleum 
products from 85% dependency in 1979 to about 48% in 1995 (http://www.ibp.org.br). 
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Despite this, Petrobras' profitability was slowly being reduced, until it became difficult 
to finance new projects, impacting on the company's performance. 
Towards the end of the 1980's, a review of macro economic policies took place. It 
resulted in a steady removal of protection measures for domestic producers and 
removal of policies directed at substituting imports. The respective energy industry 
authorities reiterated the idea that private investors be accorded significant recognition 
in Brazilian markets (de Oliveira, 1998 and http://www.ibp.org.br).This meant the 
introduction of a series of reforms among which, was the privatisation of public 
companies including Petrobras. It also meant introducing competition wherever it was 
found feasible. The National Petroleum Agency, an independent body was charged 
with implementing these new energy policies (http://www.gasandoil.com). Hence 
Petrobas' monopoly ceased towards the end of 1997 when the petroleum law, 
deregulating the sector, was announced. 
Regarding the use of terminals and pipelines that belonged to Petrobras, after 
deregulation, the new entrants were allowed fair access to those facilities, with 
Petrobras still keeping control. It has also retained ownership of refineries, but has to 
get the approval of the regulatory agency if considering expansion of the production 
capacity. Similarly, new investors have to apply for approval to construct new 
refineries. 
Impacts of deregulation and privatisation 
Brazil just started announcing the deregulation of its petroleum sector in 1997 and it is 
therefore too early to comment on its experience. Also, complete privatisation of 
Petrobas is not expected, as some still believe that the government must retain a large 
interest. As a result of this, according to the national survey conducted towards the end 
of 1999 (dos Santos, 2000), there is no consensus regarding further deregulation of the 
downstream industry. This is going to create problems for competition in the industry 
as private investors may doubt the fairness of the game if they are to compete with 
Petrobas. 
3.2.4 Peru 
Peru's petroleum supply and demand situation over the 1985 -1995 period is depicted 
in Table 3.2.4. Production of crude declined by about 3 million tons in 1995 from 1985. 
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This resulted in an increase of products imports over the years while the consumption 
of products has been relatively stable. 
Table. 3.2.4 Supply of and demand for crude and products (m t) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Crude production 9.55 9 8.16 7.07 6.49 6.39 5.72 5.76 6.3 6.43 6.15 
Net crude exports 1.26 0.65 -0.12 -0.94 -0.88 -0.72 -1.62 -1.52 -1.26 -1.08 -0.99 
Net product exports 2.68 2.35 2 1.4 1.67 1.44 1.91 1.66 1.84 1.11 -0.31 
Product consumption 5.56 6.01 6.56 6.5 5.9 5.87 5.63 5.54 5.77 6.39 6.88 
Source: Compiled from lEA. 1997. 
Status before liberalisation 
The Peruvian oil industry had for decades been a state-controlled industry. Its general 
economic policies and the institutional framework were not conducive to private 
investment. Corruption and the high incidence of terrorism were acting as strong 
barriers to investment in the economy as a whole. Petroperu was an integrated state-
owned company, responsible for the production of about 49% of the national crude 
output. 
The company almost had a monopoly in the downstream industry. It operated six 
refineries with an overall capacity of 180 thousand barrels per day. Of these, Talara and 
La Pampilla were the two largest. The integration ensured that petroleum products 
were made available across the country at uniform prices. There were 83 service 
stations owned by the company and only 23 in private hands. With time the petroleum 
industry started showing signs of deterioration. 
Petroperu was operating at sub-optimal levels and was unable to maintain and invest 
in necessary upgrades. This resulted in an increase in the import of crude and 
products. The company's personnel were convinced that the poor performance of the 
company could be reversed by a withdrawal of government from business affairs in 
this industry. They were committed to continue running the business and serving the 
industry continuously, without any disruptions in supply (Mayorga Alba, et. ai., 1997). 
With the situation further worsening towards end of the 1980's, various options to save 
the company had to be considered. 
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After 1990, change in the Peruvian economy was inevitable. The petroleum sector also 
planned policy reforms as part of the overall change that was taking place in the 
economy. A redefinition of the role of the government was called for. In this new 
thinking, the state was entrusted with the role of providing social services and letting 
the private sector play a greater role in productive and commercial activities. A 
competitive market was considered most suitable to achieve better outcomes. 
Privatisation of Petroperu was the chosen option, but the first step was to restructure. 
The process involved correcting for price distortions so as to allow the company to 
regain financial viability. Of major concern was the path to be followed in deciding the 
new structure of Petroperu. Two ideas were the cause of bitter debate among relevant 
stakeholders. One was privatising Petroperu as an integrated company5, the other was 
privatising it as an unbundled company in which separate units would be privatised 
independently. 
With the first option what was envisaged was that the likelihood of disrupting supply 
would be lower and that there would be no risk of failing to find buyers for certain 
units of business and assets. Advantages such as efficiency associated with an 
integrated company would be maintained. In addition, there was the understanding 
that the proceeds to be earned were expected to be higher than if the company was 
disintegrated. 
There were, however, also disadvantages that would come with the choice of this 
option. These included the risk of failing to secure a buyer for the entire company. If a 
buyer were available there would be difficulties in introducing competition into the 
industry. This would entail transforming a public monopoly company to private 
monopoly. The company would still retain all of its market share. In that case also, the 
government would in a way still have to be involved as it would be felt that the private 
monopoly company would need to be regulated so as not to abuse its market power. 
It is important to bear in mind that what prompted the change in the first place was the 
need to reduce government interference in the industry, promote competition in 
provision of services and encourage private sector involvement. The choice of this first 
option would not fulfil these basic objectives. A long time would have to pass before 
everything could be ready for complete privatisation. 
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The choice of an unbundled company on the other hand, meant that the company 
would be divided or broken down into separate business units and privatised 
separately. The industry would then later be deregulated. It was expected that this 
would increase the chances of having different players in the industry. Small investors 
who could not afford buying the entire unit would also be given an opportunity to 
participate. This way competition could be expected to increase. The disadvantage of 
remaining with some unattractive units unsold, however, was recognised. 
The existence of these unsold units could lead to the use of unfavourable methods or 
terms of privatisation to get rid of such units. Also, co-ordination throughout the 
supply chain could not be guaranteed once units were broken into separate entities 
and disruptions could be expected. This demanded a well-calculated plan to try and 
minimise disruptions as far as possible. 
Privatisation and deregulation 
After careful consideration and heated debates, the latter option was taken. The 
ultimate goal after privatisation was full deregulation of industry prices. The process 
began during 1991/92. During this same time, the industry'S institutional and 
regulatory framework were also under review. This was reaffirmed in 1993 with the 
passing of the new law that ended Petroperu's monopoly and allowed entrance of 
private investors to any activity of the supply chain. Closing the operations that were 
making financial losses was part of the process. Also, personnel had to be reduced 
from 10 000 to 6000 by 1994 (Mayorga Alba, et. al., 1997). 
Peru has a small market, which creates a natural monopoly in storage and transport 
facilities. That is, because of the small size of the market it is difficult to introduce 
competition for such a market, as it would mean duplication of services and a waste of 
resources. The best way therefore was to leave these activities as they were and to start 
privatising those in which competition could be workable. 
Retail margins were deregulated. This made possible the privatisation of retail service 
stations, and ended the uniform pricing of gasoline across the country. The process 
began with the sale of 90% of Petroperu's retail stations. After 3 years of privatisation, 
price differences among service stations started being noticed, according to whether 
5 Petroperu would be privatised retaining all the core activities and business units after restructuring. 
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the oil-company, franchisee or smaller independent retailers own the station. 
Restrictions to the number and locations of service stations were removed. 
Deregulation removed previous price regulations and thus supply and demand forces 
set prices of petroleum products. As a transitional measure, prices were set by use of a 
formula, determining the opportunity cost that would be paid in international markets 
after making adjustments for transport, quality standards. The US Gulf of Mexico was 
used as reference. 
As a further step towards deregulation, subSidy and taxation policy for kerosene and 
LPG were reviewed, resulting in the removal of subsidies for kerosene and bringing 
the excise taxes of the two products to the same levels thus also encouraging the use of 
LPG that was preViously highly taxed. 
Impacts of deregulation 
The sector saw a build up of investments around US$ 250M. Service improvement and 
infrastructure were associated with the entrance of new investors into the industry. 
There were 810 retail stations by 1996 of which about 500 were owned by the 
international companies operating in Peru. The gas business contributed by attracting 
private investment that was seen with the construction of larger LPG reception 
facilities. The number of gas filling stations has more than doubled. 
Petroleum product taxes earn the government revenue of US$ 1000 million per year. 
This represents a significant contribution to Peru's economy. The tax structure 
encourages the use of the more abundant and environmentally benign domestic 
energy, that contribute positively to sustainable development and growth of the 
economy. A notable attribute of the tax structure was its use as a tool for the 
redistribution of income and the improvement of economic growth. 
The smooth transfer and absorption of most Petroperu staff was another important fact 
in the privatisation process. The company's management contributed very much to 
seeing the process through. 
Problems encountered 
The privatisation of refineries has been slow. It was a political move to give the 
government control over its electoral agenda. The main challenge was that of 
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privatising La Pampilla, one of the largest refineries. Up to 60% of its shares were 
released and put up for bids. This allowed participation and brought in competition by 
Repsol Spain, YPF Argentina, Mobil, El Banco Wiese and Fondo de Privatizacion Peru. 
There are still refineries and wholesale terminals to be privatised. This would allow full 
deregulation of the downstream sector. 
3.2.5 Nicaragua 
Nicaragua does not have oil resources and has to depend on imports for this source of 
energy. Before 1989, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were the major suppliers of 
oil, but with the political instability that was experienced, the supplies decreased 
significantly. Currently, (USAID, 1998) oil is imported from Venezuela and Mexico. 
About a third of petroleum products demand is satisfied by imports. The size of crude 
imports in 1995 and products consumption by sector is shown in Table 3.2.5. 
Tale3.2.5 Crude imports and product consumption by sector. 1995 ('000 toe) 
Crude Products 
Imports 768 855 
I 
Exports a -11 
Industry (%) 0 19 
Transport (%) 0 65 
Other sectors (%) 0 16 
Source: Prepared from lEA. 1997. 
There are three international oil companies operating in the country's downstream sub 
sector, and a state-owned company. The government has been involved in the industry 
through regulations and active participation. 
Phased liberalisation 
In 1995 a hydrocarbons decree relaxing the restrictions on prices of various petroleum 
products and import of hydrocarbons was passed. Consumer price caps on some 
products were set, otherwise allowing participants in the sector to determine margins 
among themselves (USAID, 1998). This form of regulation was intended to give firms 
an incentive to innovate, since any reductions in cost benefits the firm. It also promotes 
production efficiency. The pricing system was intended to be only transitional until the 
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industry has adjusted to the market system. Thereafter demand and supply would 
determine prices of petroleum products. The process is still in progress. 
3.2.6 El Salvador 
EI Salvador does not have any proven reserves of oil, therefore all oil consumed in the 
country is imported. Petroleum constitutes 30% of the primary energy demand. 
Consumption by sector is shown in Table 3.2.6. This sub-sector consists of private 
international companies, Exxon, Shell and Texaco responsible for refining and 
distribution of products. The government regulated all the activities of the industry. 










Source: Compiled from lEA. 1997 
Phased liberalisation 
With the wave of liberalisation and deregulation sweeping across countries, the 
government of El Salvador also decided slowly to open the petroleum industry to 
market forces. An import parity pricing formula was adopted. This was a step toward 
opening prices to market forces in 1994. Instead of rushing straight into deregulation, it 
was a way of allowing companies to prepare for the fierce competition they would find 
themselves in once deregulation was complete. It helped determine the price of 
imported oil by reflecting the international price after adjusting for quality and 
handling costs (USAID, 1998). It was regarded as fairly efficient as it was cost-
reflective. 
The changes to pricing systems reflective of costs of acquiring crude oil and! or the 
products appeared already to have the effect of increasing private investment, notes 
USAID (1998). New companies are encouraged to enter the market at different levels of 
the supply chain. The reforms are still in their infant stages or halfway through their 
implementation. As the industry is still in transition it would therefore be premature to 
come up with impacts. 
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3.2.7 Kenya 
Petroleum products represent about 24% of primary energy needs of the Kenyan 
population (Okech, et. ai., 1999). Petroleum is a significant source of energy in all 
sectors, with the transport sector showing complete dependence on petroleum fuels. A 
breakdown of petroleum fuels usage by sector shows that, after transport, the 
commercial sector is the largest consumer, followed by manufacturing, agriculture and 
household respectively. This is shown in Table 3.2.7. 
Table 3.2.7. 
SECTOR Petroleum as a (%) of sector I 
energy use 
i Transport 100 • 
Cor III I It::lt;IClI 66 
Manufacturing 38 
Agriculture 19 
• Household 14 
Source: Okech. et. al., 1999 
Status before liberalisation 
The state-owned the national corporation of Kenya (NCOK) a crude importer not 
involved in refining and handling of refined products was established to ensure 
undisrupted supply of oil for all Kenyans. Reliable supply is a concern since Kenya 
does not have any proven reserves of its own. 
Kenya imported all its crude needs and there were no restrictions on importation of 
crude except that, thirty-percent of all imports made by oil companies had to be 
purchased from the NCOK. Product imports were not allowed. Although the state did 
not have a monopoly in operating the industry, there was a host of regulations 
preventing competition. 
Deregulation 
The government removed price controls on petroleum in 1993 but was not convinced 
that full deregulation was the right move, despite the sector's sub-optimal 
performance. The sole refinery, for example, built in the 1960's and upgraded in the 
1970's, was inefficient, leaving the country with a high diesel percentage to dispose of. 
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The state, according to List (1994), owned a 50% share of the refinery, with the 
international oil companies, Shell and BP, Esso, Caltex holding the rest. 
Removal of price controls was seen as sufficient deregulation. Other regulations that 
were still remaining in the petroleum sector were: 
• Enforced refining of all the country's white product needs in the single Kenya's 
refinery in Mombasa. 
• Import of white product was forbidden 
• Use of road transport of fuel on certain routes was prohibited by enforcing the use 
of state-owned oil pipelines between Mombasa and Nairobi and to other three 
larger towns on the Western part of the country (List, 1994). Pipelines were owned 
and run by the parastatal, Kenya Pipeline Company (KPC). 
Impacts of deregulation 
Regulatory framework 
Liberalisation of the market was implemented without adequate regulatory measures 
in place. The abuse of consumer rights as a result of price leadership is one example of 
this. The government does not have intervention measures to protect consumers 
against such practices. The Restrictive Trade Practices; Monopoly and Prices Control 
Act, Chapter 504 of the Laws of Kenya are supposed to empower the government to 
deal with issues like these. They are, however, inadequate. The legal process needed to 
prove that a firm committed a restrictive offence and the light penalties awarded are 
not supportive of the Act (Okech, et. al., 1999: 49). The Petroleum Act that is under 
review will hopefully encompass intervention measures where necessary to protect 
consumers. 
Market struchlfe 
As before liberalisation there are seven companies operating in the downstream 
market. These are Shell/BP (24%), Caltex (22%), Total (15%), Agip (13%), Esso (13%), 
Kobil (9%) and Kenol (4%). The market structure is defined as an oligopoly. 
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There are a few firms, (Shell/BP, Caltex and Total) holding more than half of the entire 
market share, and the concentration ratio, used, the Herfindal Hirshman Index, points 
towards an oligopoly structure. 
This market structure and the conditions resulting from its existence tend to create 
barriers to entry into the market. The established companies are found to deter 
potential entrants in that existing companies are not willing to share facilities with 
would-be-entrants. Also, the Kenya Petroleum Refinery Limited (KPRL) has an 
agreement with the oil companies to process their crude at a fee. The fact that KPRL 
also controls storage facilities for refined products means that a new operator cannot 
be guaranteed a fair deal by KPRL. There will be a conflict of interests. This situation 
favours existing companies who already have a reputation of working with KPRL. 
Existing firms insist that potential entrants be required to refine some of their products 
domestically to contribute to the production of LPG for domestic consumption (Okech, 
et. aI., 1999). This shows the influence that these companies exert on the petroleum 
industry. 
As regards the pricing of products, price leadership, has developed following 
deregulation. This is in accordance with the prevailing oligopoly structure, contrary to 
the competitive market operation that was intended. The structure of the market rather 
than collusive behaviour is responsible for this pricing behaviour (Okech, et. ai. 1999). 
Product prices, as a result, are very high. 
The underlying objective of taxes is to generate revenue for the state, to promote 
equitable distribution and the conservation of energy. Taxes account for a relatively 
high proportion of product cost I price. This can be seen to be in line with the objective 
of raising revenue. 
The taxes applicable include customs duty, excise duty, Value Added Tax (VAT), 
Petroleum Development Levy (PDL), and Road Maintenance Levy (RML). Taxes 
discriminate between different products. 
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Table 3.2.7.1 Product taxation 
• Product Customs Excise • VAT 
• 
duty duty 
i Jet Fuel N/A N/A N/A 
I Petrol A A N/A 
I Automotive A A N/A 
• diesel 
j"luminating N/A N/A N/A 
Paraffin 
• LPG A 
N/A A 
Source: Prepared from Okech. et. aI., 1999. 
*Abbreviations. A - Applicable; N/A Not applicable 
POL RML 
I 
N/A I N/A I 




It should be noted that illuminating paraffin is only subject to PDL, representing 1% of 
the final price in the period 1990 - 1996. In the case of petrol, Okech, et. al. I (1999), 
highlight the fact that the tax component in the final price ranged between 30% and 
50% in the same period. 
Taxation of products is implemented in a manner that is not satisfactory. The 
discriminatory nature of taxes introduces price distortions in the market. Also, 
discriminatory tax policy seems to contradict government's objective of conservation 
for those products carrying relatively low taxes. 
Product quality 
Shortages of products became a common problem. There are also common instances of 
imported products that do not meet domestic consumer specifications (Mbendi, 1995). 
The quality of products and service to consumers thus deteriorated even further after 
deregulation. 
3.2.8 Portugal 
Portugal does not have energy resources other than hydroelectricity, biomass and 
some wind power. For other energy sources therefore, it has to depend on imports of 
about 90% of all its primary energy. Oil represents 70% of that and constitutes 80% of 
overall consumption (lEA, 1997). Table 3.2.8 shows the situation of the energy 
economy of PortugaL 
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The energy industry in general has until recently been under strict regulation by the 
government. The oil sector has thus been functioning under various laws affecting the 
industry from refining to the formulation of retail prices. 
Table. 3.2.8 Breakdown of energy primary demand by type and crude imports ('000 tep) 
1980 1985 1990 1995 
Primary energy demand 10020 11420 16410 19165 
Coal 422 759 2760 3604 
Oil 8009 8564 11730 13649 
Electricity 851 1126 
112S~7 
811 
Other 738 971 1102 
Oil imports 9346 8656 14351 
Source: DGE in WEC (1998) 
The government and the refiners came to an agreement regarding the installation and 
operation of refineries. The major oil products, namely gasoline, diesel, kerosene and 
fuel oiL were distributed under a quota system. This mechanism guaranteed the 
refining sub-sector a good operation in the local market. The number of companies 
functional in product distribution had been constant at seven companies between 
1939/40 (when the refining business started) and 1985 (Nunez, 1998). 
In addition, an administrative price-fixing system was used in which most product 
prices included a supply differential in the form of compensation by the state. Liquid 
petroleum gas, aviation fuel and products that were intended for international fishing 
were exempt from this pricing policy. 
Although efforts aimed at increasing domestic production of other energy sources 
were made, the consumption of oil has not shown any decline, as indicated by the 
continued increase of imports. The discovery of natural gas expected to supply around 
10% of the primary demand, is the result of efforts to diversify energy use. 
The central government forces private companies who have the right to import to 
finance reserves of petroleum products. The main products, which the government 
insists have to be permanently in stock, are automotive gasoline, kerosene, jet fuel, 
aviation jet kerosene, diesel, and fuel oils. The minimum reserves of these products 
vary, with those for aviation jet kerosene and fuel oil at 90 days import. For fuel oil, 
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compulsory financing of reserves applies to those importers whose major business is 
electricity production. As for the rest of the products, the requirement is 120 days 
reserves. 
Privatisation and Deregulation 
The need to conform to the European Community directive is seen to have been the 
driving force towards liberalisation. The process was carried out in a phased manner to 
allow smooth adjustment to the changes. 
The first step was implemented in 1991 with the removal of the quota system at 
distribution, allowing the market share of each company to be determined by its 
competitive ability. 
The pricing policy originally designed to protect the domestic refining industry was 
abolished, together with the Tax on Oil Products charged on products according to 
place of origin. The tax was instituted specifically to discourage participants from 
resorting to foreign markets for their supplies. Regulation of the pricing of premium 
leaded gasoline, diesel and fuel oil with sulphur content above 1 %, however, remained. 
AlongSide liberalisation of the oil market, the government proceeded with the 
privatisation of the state refinery Petrogal, which was the only refinery. At first, it was 
exposed to commercial principles where it faced competition in the form of imported 
products. In 1992, 25% of the share capital was sold, and the state interest was further 
reduced by 20% in 1995, leaving it with a 55% holding. 
The lEA (1997) notes that the further deregulation that took place in 1997 ended the 
remaining price ceiling on heavy fuel oil. The difference between the price of leaded 
and unleaded gasoline was still maintained to encourage the fast penetration of 
unleaded gasoline into the market. 
Problems encountered 
The question of reserves financed by private companies remains an issue that has to be 
resolved. It causes a competitive disadvantage for Portugese companies over their 
European counterparts (Nunez, 1998) who are not faced with such a requirement. 
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3.2.9 Italy 
Italy is highly dependent on imports for its primary energy demand, and oil accounts 
for 59% of that (IEA, 1997). The country's oil situation is shown in table below. There is 
a high level of importation, both of crude and products, and there are no exports of 
crude. Energy security becomes an important consideration for the government. 
Table. 3.2.9 Crude and products supply and demand (m t) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Crude production 2.41 2.56 3.94 4.84 4.6 4.67 4.33 4.5 4.64 4.9 5.24 
Crude imports 63.55 71.88 67.44 65.11 68.54 74.73 73.06 77.99 77.21 75.23 73.52 
Product imports 19.89 17.14 24.82 22.12 24.58 23.61 21.42 23.36 23.95 23.03 24.95 
Product exports 12.10 16.80 14.37 15.17 14.39 16.97 18.57 21.21 22.60 19.50 16.91 
Source: Prepared form lEA Energy Balances, 1997. 
Diversification was identified as the possible means to ensure energy security, by 
reducing the heavy reliance on imported oil. The import of oil impacts significantly on 
the operation of the whole economy, particularly because, as the IEA (1997) indicates, 
over half of electricity generation is through oil-fired plants. This makes the country 
highly vulnerable to supply disruptions that can result in the social and economic 
status of the economy being undermined. 
Status before liberalisation 
Historically the oil industry had been regulated. The government had control over the 
pricing of products. To open a service station a special grant from local authorities was 
required. Opening and closing hours for business were based on a pre-determined 
timetable government, with fewer hours of business over the weekends being granted. 
On Saturdays, only half the number of stations were allowed to operate, with the 
number reduced to a quarter on Sundays (Grassini, 1998). 
ENI had monopoly control of storage facilities. Of the total service stations, oil 
companies owned about 62% and, the rest belonged to small independent owners. Of 
those owned by independents, 80% were leased to oil companies. Self-service was only 
applicable to less than 10% of the stations. 
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The government, however, announced its intentions to liberalise the industry in 1996. 
EN! started privatising in accordance with the plan of government to liberalise the 
industry (lEA, 1997). 
Problems encountered 
In areas where regulation has caused cross-subsidies, deregulation is not welcomed by 
the general public since it is understood that those subsidies will have to be removed. 
Tax constitutes about 80% of the price of petrol in Italy. The fear is that, should the 
subsidies be removed, the customers who were subsidised will remain without the 
services as few can afford the market prices. No supplier will be willing to supply an 
area that does not allow recovery of the costs. In essence, this means that many service 
stations in those areas would have to close down in order to increase throughput. This 
would further complicate the case of poor communities. 
A reduction of service stations means that rural consumers have to travel long 
distances to obtain service. Proponents of continued regulation contend that this is 
socially unacceptable. It is understood that liberalisation will result in higher prices for 
these customers as there are few big consumers and high distribution costs. 
On this issue, Grassini (1998) warns that, in some instances, cross-subsidies may be 
politically unavoidable, even after deregulation or liberalisation. Of importance in such 
cases is the transparency in the manner in which subsidies are funded and 
adminis tered. 
Fear of job losses is an additional reason for rejecting liberalisation in the Italian 
industry. The public is convinced that liberalisation will benefit the oil companies at 
the expense of the public, through job losses. The process has not proceeded because of 
these problems. 
3.2.10 Hungary 
Hungary has for a long time had a command economy; that is, one in which decisions 
to produce, how much to invest and ownership control of most industries was in 
government hands. In the energy sector, the economy is largely dependent on imports 
for oil, with all imported crude coming from Russia (Brendow, et. al., 1998). Small 
quantities of crude are produced domestically. Production and consumption volumes 
over the 1985-1995 period are shown in Table 3.2.10. Crude imports far exceed the 
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domestic production volumes, indicating the dependence on imported oil. Small 
quantities of products are imported. 
Table 3.2.10 Crude production and product trade, 1985 -1995 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Crude production 2.52 2.48 2.42 2.38 2.38 2.3 2.21 2.15 2.04 1.96 2.06 
Crude imports 6.43 6.78 6.47 6.92 6.32 6.42 5.28 5.7 6.03 5.52 5.87 
Net product imports 0.70 0.17 0.17 -0.71 -0.17 0.13 -0.50 -0.05 0.08 0.06 -0.39 
Source: Energy Balances of Non-DECO countries, 1997. 
The fact that a significant amount of the oil consumed in the country has to be 
imported was seen to increase the vulnerability of the country to supply shocks and 
disruptions. Hence high government involvement, to ensure security of supply to all 
its citizens, was advocated. 
Increased supply security, with less negative impacts on the budget are quoted as the 
main objectives of the Hungarian petroleum industry, according to the Brendow, et. al., 
(1998). This was based on the belief that liberalisation would attract private capital 
investments, thus relieving the budget of the need to finance imported energy. It was 
also identified as one of the most effective ways that could promote supply 
diversification to reduce import reliance on oil. 
Status before liberalisation 
Negotiations regarding importation and prices of crude and products were the 
responsibility of the state-owned company, Mineralimpex. Up until 1991, the fully 
integrated oil company, Hungarian Oil and Gas (OKGT), was the sole supplier of 
petroleum products. OKGT had a monopoly in production, storage, refining, but not 
retailing. Its subsidiary company, AFOR, was the operator at the oil product wholesale 
and retail levels. 
Commercialisation 
The liberalisation process involved commercialisation of the institutions operative in 
the industry and the development of a legal framework within which liberalisation 
could run effectively. 
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In 1991, the OKGT was commercialised and changed into a joint stock company called 
MOL. The internal structure changed significantly and MOL was exposed to 
competitive means of doing business. In 1995 Mineralimpex became a fully owned 
subsidiary of MOL. Under the new setting, the state still controls the emergency stock 
reserves. Emergency reserves of over 115 days of oil imports are held. This figure also 
includes the operational and emergency stocks held by oil companies of about 25 days 
of imports. The difference is made up by MOL reserves. 
All imported oil still comes from Russia, Brendow, et. ai. (1998) note, despite the 
opening up of the pipeline between the sea terminal on Adria and the major refinery in 
Hungary that was closed during the war in the region from 1991. The pipeline business 
for oil is a monopoly of MOL. 
Just at the beginning of the liberalisation process, threats of oil shortages increased and 
the government decided to sell well over one hundred filling stations to multinational 
oil companies. The stations sold off were the ones performing well in terms of 
profitability and turnover, asserts Brendow, et. ai. (1998). This reduced the market 
share of MOL from 80% to 30%. 
Oil prices were liberalised in 1991. Mineralimpex no longer had a monopoly over 
imports of crude and products. The competitive pressure created by imports from 
refineries in neighbouring countries is thought to be enough to guard against the 
potential abuse of the dominant position by MOL. However, importers are forced to 
contribute to the emergency reserves of up to 90 days demand. 
There are no serious problems encountered in the process that are known. 
Impacts 
That the process has been smooth can be attributed to the extensive consultation by the 
government with all the stakeholders in the industry. Before the implementation, the 
public was fully aware of what was happening and had welcomed the proposed 
changes. Privatisation was chosen to facilitate liberalisation because it was regarded as 
an immediate way of separating the usually contradictory functions of investment, 
operation and regulation by the government among the relevant players. Over 300 
small private enterprises were established following liberalisation of the industry. 
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3.2.11 Thailand 
This country does not produce enough crude to satisfy domestic demand. This 
demand has to be satisfied by imports. In the last decade, the country had strong 
economic growth that increased living standards leading to an increase in overall 
energy consumption. 
The transport sector has been the major contributor to the increased growth of energy 
consumption. It represents the biggest proportion of total final energy demand at 54%. The 
sector utilises 60% of oil products mainly through the use of gasoline and diesel. The levels 
of production and consumption are indicated in table 3.2.1 L 
In the light of its dependence on imported oil, the government promoted 
diversification of energy use through development of natural gas and coal to substitute 
for oil. Also significant was the encouragement of energy efficiency in energy 
production and use. 
Table 3.2.11 Oil production and demand (m t) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Crude production 2.17 2.22 2.07 2.38 2.4 2.83 3.27 3.66 3.49 3.54 3.48 
Crude imports 6.75 7.18 7.87 7.51 10.61 10.88 11.01 13.83 16.12 18.64 22.88 
Net product imports 2.32 2.06 3.15 4.27 5.14 7.67 7.90 7.86 8.52 8.18 8.75 
Product demand 10.61 11.23 12.18 13.91 16.49 20.25 21.18 23.39 26.38 28.96 32.87 
Source: Prepared from lEA Energy Balances, 1997. 
Status before deregulation 
The downstream oil sub-sector was dominated by an integrated state-owned company, 
the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT). Entry into the industry was by way of 
licences issued by the government. This allowed control of the number of entrants into 
the industry. 
PTT was considered an efficient state-owned company that ensured undisrupted 
product supply in the country. However, there were no service stations in rural areas. 
Consumers relied on informal suppliers who sold their petrol at more than double the 
price paid at the pumps (NEPO, 1995). PIT had a market share of 30% in distribution 
and marketing of oil. PIT shared the retail market with Shell, Esso and Caltex. 
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Imports of oil were regulated through a quota system to protect domestic refiners from 
international competition. The companies' margins were regulated and were generally 
kept constant. Retail prices of petroleum products were also regulated and linked to 
Singapore prices until 1991. 
Deregulation 
The government embarked on a program of deregulation of the sector in 1991. The 
objectives of deregulation were to increase competition in the sector and to relieve the 
government of the duty of determining prices. The first phase of deregulation was 
effected in May 1991. Import control was removed. Issuing of operating permits was 
reviewed, with the purpose of encouraging new entrants into the oil business. 
Import parity pricing was maintained. Margins were flexible and the oil companies 
were expected to change wholesale prices in accordance with changes in margins. 
Service station operators reported monthly price changes at the pump to the 
government. 
The second phase of deregulation was put in place on 19 August 1991, liberalising 
prices (NEPO, 1995). Regulation of imports is maintained. An import levy is required 
to ensure the survival of domestic refineries. The refineries pay the government 2% of 
gross revenue in return for the protection afforded. For PIT the "protection fee" is 35% 
of gross revenues. 
Impacts 
Following deregulation there has been a significant increase in the number of 
participants and the number of service stations. Growth in the number of service 
stations in rural areas is largely by new small operators rather than by the big oil 
companies. The overall quality of service has improved. 
Further changes are expected in the sector as the government speeds up the 
privatisation of its enterprises following the East Asian financial crisis of 1998. There 
was an understanding that sectors that are not controlled could cope with crises. This 
means that the different business units of PIT will be sold to private owners, injecting 
a new wave of competition and causing an increase in the number of participants in 
the industry (NEPO, 29/03/1999). 
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3.2.12 Philippines 
Status before deregulation 
The Philippines has limited production of crude oil, which meets around 10% of the 
country's total primary energy supply. The Philippines is dependent on imports for a 
large part of the oil demand. The country's situation is depicted in table 3.2.12. 
Table. 3.2.12 Crude and product production and demand ('000 bpd) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Crude production 8 7 5.4 6 5.2 4.8 3.2 8 10 6 3.8 
Crude imports 
Net product imports 
Product demand 
133.4 137.8 167 194 194.4 219.8 210.4 244.2 257 266.4 358.8 
9.5 8.1 21.3 13.3 22.7 12.2 22.2 31.6 33.0 36.1 37.7 
165.9 174.8 182.6 193.2 221.9 224.4 226.4 259.8 271.0 279.1 334.5 
Source: Prepared from lEA Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, 1997. 
The history of government control over the downstream petroleum industry in the 
Philippines dates as far back as the first international oil crisis in 1973. The aim was to 
ensure the continued supply of products throughout the country. Government 
involvement was through the regulation of prices and oil companies' margins. The 
imports and/or exports of products were controlled. In recent years, however, the 
industry's profitability deteriorated. Investment in the industry infrastructure's 
dropped. 
Before deregulation, the downstream industry was characterised by an oligopoly 
structure, in which few firms controlled the supply of products and services to the 
market. The oil companies operating in the industry were Caltex, PetronI and Shell. 
Each company's current refinery capacity in bpd, and the date of commissioning were 
as follows: 260 000 (1954), 155 000 (1961) and 3000 bpd respectively (Oil and Gas, 1994). 
By 1994, in line with the overall regulatory reforms of the economy, discussions about 
deregulating the petroleum industry began. The government planned a two - year 
transition period. This was meant to give an opportunity to adjust to the new business 
principles and to allow new players a level playing field with the existing participants. 
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Deregulation 
In March 1996, the downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996 was put in 
place. The main aims of deregulation were to encourage competition and private 
investment in the industry. This was expected to ensure the supply of quality products 
and services at fair prices. 
The other objective was to attract private investment both from local and international 
companies (Tiffany, 1996). This would contribute to alleviating the poor infrastructure 
that was slowly deteriorating. During the same year, however, the deregulation act 
was nullified by the high court, on the grounds that it lacked in enforcement of 
competition, and also, that it was unconstitutional (Oilgram News, 1998). 
After lengthy deliberations, the new deregulation law was passed in 1998. With the 
new law, a transitional period of five months was established before full deregulation 
was allowed. It gave the president powers to shorten the length of the transition, in 
consultation with the industry participants. 
The new law specifically includes guidelines to prevent the formation of cartels and 
predatory pricing in the industry. It also requires the companies involved in refining to 
be listed on a stock exchange three years after operation for new refiners, and three 
years after the law takes effect for existing refiners (Oilgram News, 11 /02/99). 
In addition, tax incentives for new entrants into the industry include five - year tax 
holiday and reduced tariff of 3% on imported capital equipment. The incentives are not 
available to existing players even if for expansion or improvement of infrastructure. 
During the transitional period, exports and imports of oil, refining, marketing and 
distribution were deregulated. Pricing was done through a formula related to 
Singapore posted prices. In support of the new pricing mechanism, an Oil Price 
Stabilisation Fund of about $ 7.5 million was set up to absorb price swings during the 
transitional period. Premium gasoline was not included in the cover. The oil company 
margins were still regulated by the government. 
Three months following the implementation of the transitional period, full 
deregulation was announced, and this allowed prices to be set by market forces. It also 
meant the removal of the Oil Price Stabilisation Fund that was already creating 
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problems for the government. It had become too cumbersome to administer, and the 
shortage of funds required the government to corne to the rescue. 
Impacts of deregulation 
It is now (October 1999) about 18 months since full deregulation of the industry. There 
are already mixed opinions about the appropriate timing of deregulation. There are 
lobbies for the reversal of the decision, claiming that the short transitional period was 
meaningless. It is claimed that the law did not give new entrants enough time to 
establish themselves in the industry. As a result there are no signs of the cartel being 
dismantled (Cruz, 1999). This comes after two price increases, following deregulation. 
The continued existence of the cartel is thought to be the major reason behind the price 
increases. 
The new entrants on the other hand are opposed to the reversal of the law, and are 
urging the critics to be patient and give deregulation enough time to work. Among 
members of this group, it is understood that it is still too early to expect the full 
realisation of the benefits of deregulation (Philippines Business, 19/05/1999). They are, 
therefore, calling upon the government to be firm in its decision, and to give 
consideration to the fact that stability and precision of policies are strong determinants 
of the attractiveness of the sector to private investors. They warn that if the law is 
scrapped, that will be for the second time, and that is bound to wipe out investors' 
confidence. Among the new entrants are Coastal Petroleum Philippines, total 
Petroleum Philippines Inc., Thailand Petroleum Authority, Flying V, Eastern 
Petroleum, Liquigaz, Pryce Gases, Total LPG, Unioil, and Seaoil (Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, }une/26/1999) 
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Production of oil for export started in 1983, with a volume approximating 160 000 
barrels per day. Since most of Australia's crude is of the light sweet quality, it has a 
very low sulphur content and is, therefore, highly suitable for the production of light 
fuels, especially for transport like petrol, kerosene and diesel. This characteristic 
causes this type of crude to be highly priced because of high demand (Petroleum 
Topics, 1994). 
In 1991, domestic production had been sufficient to cover demand. Consumption has 
been growing faster than production, resulting in increase in imports. Although 
domestic production accounted for most of the oil refined in the country, the scenario 
has been changing with the increased growth of demand for petroleum products. 
Presently Australia has become both a producer and importer of crude oil. 
The Australian Institute of Petroleum (1997) recorded a growth of 26% in demand 
during the period 1985 -1995. Demand for petrol over the same period grew by 13%, 
and that for automotive diesel by 39%. A large portion of the total consumption is 
concentrated in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. 
The major products are petroL automotive diesel fuel and aviation fueL each 
constituting 46°1<), 27% and 11% respectively. Over 80% of the demand for petroleum 
products is from the transport sector. Table 2 gives an indication of product demand, 
as indicated by the local refineries' configurations. 
Table 2. Refinery output; import and exports. 1992 - 1993 
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With refined petroleum products, Australia is relatively self sufficient, and imports 
only account for 8% of demand. This, however, has increased compared to the 
percentage of imports throughout 1970 -1980. 
The downstream oil industry consists of integrated refining and marketing companies, 
and independents with no direct links with major oil companies. Independents are 
involved in different activities ranging from importing, distributing, and independent 
retailing. There are nine refineries with an overall capacity of 804 000 bpd. The four oil 
companies, Ampol, BP, Mobil and Shell operate eight of these. The refineries are each 
situated close to a port facility, near large demand centres. Refinery capacities are 
shown below. 
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Table 3 Refinery capacity and dates of operation 
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Source: Australian Institute of Petroleum (1996) in ACIL (1997) 
Australia is a big country with a dispersed population that accounts for the geographic 
positioning of refineries, in order to utilise economies of scale associated with refining. 
Because of the geographic location of refineries, there are exchange agreements 
between companies to supply parts of the country where a company does not have a 
refinery. Exchanges are made on the basis of exchange for equal volume of products in 
order to reduce costs of transporting products to distant markets. 
Refining is highly capital-intensive and maximum throughput can help reduce unit 
costs. It should be noted that refineries cannot operate at full (100%) capacity because 
of, among other things, routine maintenance. However, the highest achievable 
utilisation capacity is being sought. Thus in 1995 over 90% of utilisation was achieved 
(ACIL, 1997) following the closure of BP and Caltex refineries to improve operational 
efficiency. This reduced overall capacity from 830 000 bpd in 1983 to current levels. 
The major oil companies control most of the product bulk storage and distribution 
facilities. This ensures the efficient distribution of petroleum products throughout the 
country. The oil companies operate 87% of the storage infrastructure, and the 
distributors operate the rest. Crude oil and refined products are moved around the 
coast and to overseas markets using tankers of different sizes for large volume 
movements as a means of reducing transport costs. Deliveries to customers are mainly 
through the use of rail trucks and road tankers. 
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Products are either distributed directly by marketers or independent distributors. 
Direct supply by refiners accounts for around 55% of total deliveries and distributors 
account for 45%. Approximately 65% of distributors are in a way associated with 
refiners through joint equity or lease agreements. They distribute branded products in 
their own tankers. Vertical integration is thus allowed through this arrangement, since 
refiners are also represented in the subsequent stages of production. The other 35% of 
distributors are independent of refiner/marketers and make their own opportunistic 
supply arrangements. 
Independent marketers include a wide range of participants ranging from chain stores 
to individual actors. This group sources its own fuel from either domestic refiners or 
imports depending on what it regards to be advantageous. Previously, when 
competition from independent actors was minimal, they had to negotiate with the 
refining companies. Currently, independents often operate in competition with the oil 
companies. They use their own distribution facilities to supply their retail sites and do 
not sell fuel on credit. This group is believed to have low overheads because they 
contract most of the activities (Industry Commission, 1994). They have an opportunity 
to distribute with or without the brand of the supplier depending, on the agreement. 
Service stations during the 1950s sold more than one brand. When demand for 
petroleum products grew, it became apparent that this form of trading could not be 
maintained. This came as a result of the increase in demand that made it easier to 
achieve economies in distribution by carrying only one brand. It allowed bigger 
storage tanks to be used cutting down on number of times retail sites could be 
supplied. This was called "solus trading". 
Solus trading resulted in a growth in the number of retail sites. The reason for this was 
that the two major oil companies, Shell and Mobil, controlled most of the existing retail 
sites through leasing. To introduce competition, other interested parties had to build 
new stations. If Shell/ Mobil were to give up some of the stations, it was expected that 
they would release the old, low-profit ones. Thus new entrants found it more attractive 
to build new sites than to take over the existing ones. 
Competition was on the basis of service and trading hours. With time, competition 
became so fierce because of the large number of service stations and high prices caused 
by the world oil price shock of 1973-74. The strategy changed from a service-oriented 
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to price-oriented one. This forced a reduction in further growth of retail stations. In 
fact, a number of some existing ones had to be closed. Since that period, Industry 
Commission (1994) notes that by 1993 the number has fallen by half. 
At retail level, a number of arrangements with refiners are in place. ACIL (1997) notes 
that, the refiners have contributed largely in terms of investing in efficient retail 
infrastructure country-wide. This may account for the continued existence of refiner-
marketers even at this level. The relationships among retailers and marketers can be 
classified into four categories: 
Company I agent operated The company, that is refiner or marketer, owns the site 
and the operator receives a fixed commission on sales from the marketer. The retailer 
cannot change the supplier before the end of the lease term. The fact that the company 
owns the capital assets and land is a binding element on the side of the retailer. The 
refiner-marketers do not realise the full benefits of vertical integration, as the marketer 
does not set the final price. In other cases the operator is an employee of the company 
who is expected to run the business on commercial principles, responsible for day-to-
day operations. Retail sites operated in this manner represent 4% of the total outlets. 
Franchised sites. The franchisee operates the outlet owned by a marketer. The site itself, 
installation of buildings, tanks and other equipment are the responsibility of the 
marketer. The operator leases from the marketer and operates according to franchise 
standards. All fuel sold is supplied by the marketer with the franchisee setting the 
price. 32% of retail outlets are operated under this agreement. 
Dealer owned/ operated sites. The dealer acquires the land and makes the necessary 
capital investments. The dealer then enters into contractual agreement with the 
marketer to carry the symbols and sell its products exclusively. If the dealer owns more 
than one site, those sites can be contracted to different companies. This provides the 
marketers with the opportunity to conduct business in areas they would otherwise not 
be permitted to operate in without regulation. These comprise 33% of outlets. 
Independent outlets. In this category, a number of operators agree to buy products 
together and show a common brand throughout the chain. In other cases distributors 
operate displaying own brand names. Within this group are those who are supplied by 
independent distributors or distributors linked to a refiner. The distributor may either 
7S 
Australia case study 
own the site, or the site belongs to a dealer or independent. This accounts for 22% of 
outlets (ACIL, 1997). 
Independent-unbranded sites. These are independently owned and operated by retailers. 
They are not linked to wholesalers, and obtain supplies from refineries or independent 
wholesalers. This group accounts for 9% of retail sites. 
It is noted that even in retailing there are economies of scale in which costs are reduced 
with throughput. This comes as a result of the spread of capital costs over larger sales 
volumes and scale economies in operation. Retail sites in which there are high volumes 
of sales are commercially viable at lower retail margins than sites with low volumes. 
On average, ACIL (1997) note, that metropolitan sites sell around 200 000 litres per 
month and the average throughput for sites in the rural areas is lower than this. 
The retail activity has attracted the entry of supermarkets, and this is expected to 
significantly increase the number of retail sites operated under the independent 
arrangements. 
4.1 Regulation of the industry 
The regulation of the industry has a long history in Australia. Regulations were 
developed in order to encourage the domestic industry, and to protect it from the 
pressure of world markets. Since the beginning of regulation, all crude oil produced 
domestically was marketed under the crude allocation scheme. The scheme was a 
voluntary agreement between producers and refiners, seen by the Commonwealth 
government (Hoffman, 1989). It assured producers a market for their product by 
providing a mechanism that ensured equal allocation of domestic crude oil to the 
refiners. 
The situation changed slightly in 1985, following a technical surplus of crude oil that 
was understood would last for a few years. Also, the realisation that production was 
bound to decline contributed to the changed situation. Together these led to a 
replacement of the crude allocation scheme by a partial allocation system that it was 
hoped would be a transitional method to a deregulated market. 
The partial allocation system was characterised by the sale of crude oil from small 
fields at the import parity price of light crude oil imported from Saudi Arabia. That is, 
the price charged for domestic crude was equivalent to the price that would be paid if 
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that crude had to be imported from Saudi Arabia, taking account of the import charges. 
Secondly, between 1985 - 1987 the refiners were allocated 350 000 bid of Bass-strait 
crude oil. Any production in excess of this was exported or sold to refiners who had 
already purchased their share (designed to uplift the local industry). During the same 
period world oil prices were volatile, and that led to the Import Parity Price being 
reviewed every two months to adjust for any price changes of A$ 1 or more. 
Of the eight Australian states, six have legislation with respect to regulation of 
petroleum products' prices. These are: 
• Price Regulation Act (1948) in New South Wales. This could be used only in 
emergency situations to prevent prices rising to very high levels during supply 
shortages. 
• Fuels Price Regulation Act (1981) in Victoria 
• Prices Act (1975), South Australia 
The above two involved the monitoring of retail petrol prices, and the setting of 
maximum retail prices for petrol, were removed in 1993 
• Petroleum Products Pricing Act (1983), West Australia 
• Fair Trading (Fuel Prices) Act (1993), Australian Capital Territory. Since this 
regulation was passed, it has not been applied. 
• Price Regulation Act (1949) Northern Territory (Industry Commission, 1994) 
In addition to these state regulations there is a Prices Surveillance Authority (PSA) that 
started functioning in 1994. It regulates prices by surveillance, which, the Industry 
Commission (1994) stresses, is different from monitoring. Surveillance is meant to 
prevent excessive prices before they arise, while monitoring involves finding out 
whether prices continue persistently to be above the expected levels that would prevail 
in a competitive market. It was put in place, firstly, in order to address concerns about 
the effectiveness of competition in the industry. Secondly, it is a way of guarding 
against duplication of regulation by state, commonwealth and Territory governments. 
The strategic importance of petroleum products and the sensitivity of the public to its 
prices were other reasons. 
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4.1.1 Wholesale pricing 
The PSA sets a common capital city maximum wholesale price for petrol and diesel. 
The price is determined by summing up the import parity price of Singapore, 
petroleum products, local component and federal excise. Products under PSA are 
petrol, dieseL AVTUR and LPG. Surveillance on aviation fuel stopped in 1990, and on 
LPG changed to price monitoring in 1991. The regulated price applies to petrol and 
diesel sold by the major oil companies, with the exception of fuel sold on fuel cards 
and by advertised tender. These companies have to submit their prices to the PSA for 
approval. 
Such prices are approved on condition that they are below or at the prevailing 
maximum wholesale price. The relevant parties, therefore, are not forced but comply 
with surveillance procedures by persuasion. It is the sales by the oil majors to 
distributors that are under regulation. Sales by the distributors are not covered, 
regardless of whether they have an agreement with the oil majors. Thus only a small 
fraction of sales in the rural areas are subject to direct price regulation, because the 
majors do not supply a number of these sites. 
The main objectives of the PSA are to place a cap on prices charged by the oil majors 
and to ensure lower country fuel prices at the expense of capital city consumers 
(Industry Commission, 1994:112). This appears to be cross-subsidisation of country by 
city consumers, but the Commission contends that cross-subsidisation is not likely. 
This is because of the high level of competition between oil majors in metropolitan 
areas, forcing prices below the maximum wholesale price. The argument continues that 
this can be shown by the difference between country and city petrol prices. 
Prices in most country towns are said to be relatively high and stable, whereas in major 
cities prices vary but are usually lower than the "lowest" country prices. The volatility 
here refers to the changes in prices offered at the retail outlets on different days, the 
number of changes in prices over a number of days or on the same day and, also, in 
differences between retail stations over the same period. 
In the case of capital city prices, one explanation for these changes and lower price can 
be found in the fact that, they are close to refineries and have a high potential for 
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demand6 to reduce any stock build-up. When stocks build up, refiners are expected to 
reduce stock levels to cut down storage costs. One quick method is to offer lower prices 
in areas of high demand where the extra product can be absorbed more quickly. 
Country and smaller towns generally have low demand, and their capacity to absorb 
extra volumes is low and involves high costs of transportation. 
4.1.2 Other regulations 
The Sites Act and Franchise Act passed in 1980 was aimed at changing the institutional 
framework in which the industry operated, while ensuring minimum intervention by 
the government at the firm level. The purpose of this was to reduce the number of 
petroleum product retailers. It was expected to rationalise service stations, and put a 
stop to the unnecessary development of stations at every major intersection resulting in 
lower prices to consumers. It was hoped that higher throughput would be achieved by 
the remaining stations which would lower the distribution costs. Despite that, the 
target number of outlets was never determined. 
The South Australian state went for a more active approach, by setting a Motor Fuel 
Distribution Act (1973) in which petrol is treated as a unique product by requiring 
interested parties to get licences or permits to sell petrol. Licenses could be given to 
those selling petrol as their main business. Those selling it as a secondary product to 
their businesses (for example, where the major business is grocery shop, motor repairs) 
can be granted permits. 
Other criteria used include: suitability of the premise; the number of licensed premises 
within a 3 km radius or 10 km radius of the premises in question, possibility of 
transferring an existing license (permit) to the proposed site, extent to which fair and 
reasonable competition within the industry of retailing will be affected (Industry 
Commission, 1994: 178). 
Various reviews of the Act suggested major changes with the 1991 review even 
proposing a repeal of the Act on the grounds that the Act was causing extra burden to 
the usual town planning procedure and increased the source of risk for retailers. Two 
important factors in this regard are that, new smaller retailers are disadvantaged, 
because the increase in resources needed to be able to acquire a licence/permit. 
Sometimes legal representation is needed to prove their capability, since they are 
6 Bear in mind that it was stated earlier that refineries are mostly located in areas of high demand. 
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inexperienced in the industry. For the oil companies this is not the case, as their costs 
may be spread by making regular applications and/ or lodging complaints. The issued 
licenses cannot be traded, because they are awarded to individuals to operate at a 
particular site. They can only be transferred to new owners if ownership of the site 
changes. 
In Australian Capital Territory, the number and location of service stations are 
restricted. As a result of that, the Industry Commission (1994) notes that prices in that 
region are higher than prices elsewhere, and that this shows the benefits accruing to 
the lessees on those sites. The level of price competition has been reduced and, in 
addition to that, advertising of prices on major roads is also forbidden. 
The Western Australia government restricts trading hours and the range of products 
sold by petroleum retailers. By so doing convenience stores development is being 
retarded. The Retail Trading Hour Act (1987) was put in place for this purpose. It is 
noted that this reduces the retailers' ability to make full use of the assets and can 
contribute to the reduction of competition, consumer choice and convenience. 
4.2 Levels of competition in the industry 
Concerns about the level of competition in the petroleum sector in general led to the 
investigation into whether such concerns were founded. It has become widely accepted 
that competition can be an incentive to improve efficiency and economic growth 
(Industry Commission, 1994) by forcing firms to be more responsive to changing 
market conditions. 
Some of the concerns stem from the realisation that the supply of petroleum products 
in the Australian markets is concentrated in the hands of a few large companies, who 
are vertically integrated in one way or another. The degree of competition can be 
determined by a number of factors: barriers to entry and exit, import competition, 
seller concentration and level of vertical integration. These are discussed below. 
4.2.1 Barriers to entry 
This refers to the ease with which firms can enter or exit the market. If firms are free to 
enter and exit the market as they wish, incumbent firms would be under pressure to 
become more efficient so as to deny new entrants profitable opportunities that might 
induce them to seek entry into the industry. On the other hand, if it is expected that 
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high losses can be incurred (like losing an investment completely: associated with sunk 
costs discussed later) on exiting the industry, entry could also be discouraged. 
A definition of the barriers to entry will be discussed in order to gain a better 
understanding of the issue. The same definition as used by the Industry Commission 
(1994) will be adopted; that barriers to entry are factors giving incumbent firms 
advantage over new or potential entrants that would allow them to earn super-normal 
profits over the medium to long term. Thus some regulations can be regarded as 
barriers to entry, together with some other factors, as will be discussed below. These 
include economies of scale, product differentiation, and capital requirements. 
• Regulatory barriers: The government of Australia is strict on environmental 
regulation. New entrants into the industry need approval to construct refineries 
and! or service stations. In the case of refineries, even the existing refiners have to 
get approval for expansion. Although such regulations apply equally to both 
incumbents and potential or new entrants, some participants see these as barriers 
to entry. Regulations that can be regarded as conforming to the definition are those 
restricting free and fair competition. 
On the other hand denying approval for a new construction restricts competition. 
In that way the incumbent companies are advantaged, as there are no 
arrangements to reduce their numbers in order to accommodate new applicants. 
Other regulations that can be regarded as conforming to the definition of barriers to 
entry are the Sites and Franchise Acts. The Sites Act controls the number of sites oil 
majors are allowed to own and operate. The Franchise Act is aimed at balancing 
bargaining powers between franchisees and franchisers. This is to be achieved by 
putting in place minimum terms and conditions for franchise agreements. These 
can be seen to be restricting free business operation in the industry. Also, the fact 
that it does not apply to all participants (for instance, independents are not 
included in its terms) means that fair competition is not allowed. 
• Economies of scale: It was noted that there are significant scale economies in 
refining. The size of the market is relatively small in relation to the large minimum 
efficient scale of the plants, making it uneconomical to have more than two 
refineries in the major capital cities. As a result, a new entrant in refining would 
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significantly increase the supply, driving down domestic prices of petroleum 
products. 
One way of avoiding a drastic fall of prices can be securing export sales. This, 
however, cannot be guaranteed, especially where such exports would have to 
compete with other Asia Pacific markets (like, Korea, Indonesia) that have more 
developed and larger refineries enabling them to capture economies of scale more 
effectively than their Australian counterparts. The expected profitability of the new 
entrant will therefore be reduced, posing a threat of loss of investment if the only 
option remaining is to exit the industry. 
This point brings the discussion to a closely related issue of sunk costs, prevailing 
in the refining business. The reason being that a refinery plant is specialist in nature 
and cannot easily be converted to or used for something else. The risk can only be 
reduced if other actors in the industry are willing to buy the equipment. 
This can only be expected if other refiners have intentions of upgrading or 
expansion (which does not seem to be possible at present in Australia). Without 
that, huge losses can be incurred, as it may imply that facilities are given away at 
unfavourably low prices for the seller. 
There are also scale economies in storage, the bulk of which is owned by the oil 
companies. New entrants, therefore, have to make arrangements to utilise the 
facilities of the competitors. This does not result in a meaningful competition. This 
also applies to the distribution infrastructure. 
• Capital requirements: Again, refining is the sub-sector most relevant to this matter, 
in which high capital is needed. With regard to entry barriers, the established firms 
are often confused as having lower costs than those facing new entry, because their 
investments were made when interest rates were lower, or their debts had been 
written off, it would be argued. If costs were lower than at present when the 
incumbent entered the industry, this does not constitute a barrier to entry. Only if 
the associated costs were to be incurred by the new entrant in protection of the 
incumbent would there be a barrier. They just reflect the advantage incumbents 
enjoy or the benefits of being first movers. 
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However, the fact that a new entrant has to enter into an agreement with the refiner 
cannot constitute free competition. A refiner can set unfavourable terms for the 
new entrant, and in so doing restrict competition. There is no evidence pointing 
towards such incidents. Also, there are no policy restrictions on imports of refined 
products and no regulatory barriers to wholesaling and retailing. 
Independent terminal operators are currently emerging (ACIL, 1997). Only when 
significant progress has been made in building independent storage facilities can 
independents be in a position to compete on a level playing field with refiners. This 
does not suggest a barrier to entry. 
4.2.2 Seller concentration 
Of importance to market competition is the degree to which sellers can collude, 
explicitly or tacitly. The assumption is that when there are few sellers, the probability 
of colluding against consumers is high. It follows from this that, as the number 
increases, it becomes difficult to monitor members of the collusion, some of whom may 
be tempted to cheat. The fear or suspicion is that, since there are few refiner marketers 
in the Australian industry, producing products (some of which have few close 
substitutes) incentives to collude may be high. Especially because refiners are to a 
certain degree vertically integrated. However, before discussing this, the issue of scale 
economies must be touched on. 
Demographic factors and therefore transport costs contribute in determining the 
structure of the market. Also, the fact that there are imports into the market continues 
to be a threat to any agreement to collude, as the importers may seize the control of the 
market at any opportunity (Industry Commission, 1994). 
The argument that importers can guard against collusive behaviour raises some 
doubts. The first point to consider in this case is that the importer has to utilise the 
competitors' storage infrastructure to present meaningful competition to domestic 
refiners. The refiners are in a position to monitor the levels of imports and detect when 
imports rise to levels that threaten their position, and squeeze the competitor out of 
business. 
The big companies have control in one way or another of over 70% of the retail outlets. 
The ability of independents, not owning a single refinery, and controlling less than half 
83 
Australia case study 
of the storage infrastmcture, to exert competitive pressure seems to be limited. These 
facts point towards a lack of free and fair competition. 
4.2.3 Vertical integration 
The petroleum industry is characterised by vertical integration of one form or another. 
This may appear to raise the entry costs of the industry. The general argument against 
vertical integration is that for a new entrant to compete against a vertically integrated 
firm it has to enter in the same way or will be disadvantaged by the incumbent. To the 
extent that there are independents operating in the industry, this may seem to create a 
false picture that there are no barriers. 
These arguments also need to be checked against the potential benefits of integrating 
vertically. Vertical integration may be chosen to increase efficiency by cutting down 
costs through for example reduction in transaction costs. The advantages that come 
with economies of scale and scope can be increased. Whether those benefits are passed 
on to the consumer is another question. So, not all vertical integration is aimed at 
reducing competition. 
A fact that should be remembered about refiner/marketers is that they are vertically 
integrated but, Industry Commission (1994) argues that they do not get all the benefits 
of that, as sellers set the final price. 
Very few retail sites are owned and operated by independents to be able to exert 
profound pressure on a vertically integrated competitor. It is not clear how this group 
is realistically able to set the final products prices without being coerced by the major 
refiners, who are their suppliers. 
The stmcture of the industry allows vertical integration, which places the competitor in 
a difficult position of competing with a refiner. The stmcture does not allow fair 
competition. A marketer who is not integrated into the refinery is forced to consider 
the option of importing products. If one considers the fact that the integrated 
companies also own 87% of the storage infrastructure, the competitor can still be 
squeezed out of business. The existing stmcture is seen as inhibiting free competition 
in the industry. 
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4.3 Regulatory reforms 
Following complaints from different industry stakeholders about lack of free 
competition and some investigations, various proposals had been tabled for the 
government to take the necessary steps. Of the main regulations that had been 
regarded as prohibiting competition and full development of the industry were the 
Sites and Franchise Acts of 1980 and also the PSA. The Sites Act was found irrelevant 
in the face of changes experienced in the industry. Since its aim was to control oil 
majors owning a certain proportion of the sites, the majors were thought to have found 
ways of by passing the act, making it ineffective. On these grounds, it was felt that it 
should be repealed. 
The Franchise Act (1980) was thought to be impractical in that it could not be legally 
enforced (Bill Digest, 1998) and, therefore, unable to address the problems it was 
designed for. It was also repealed. 
The Prices Surveillance failed to achieve the objectives for which it was designed. It has 
instead served as a price floor for country prices and as a target to which prices return 
after a discount cycle (Bills Digest, 1998). 
The "Strengthened Oilcode" was meant to cover the areas that were supposed to be 
under these Acts. This would (if accepted, as it was still a proposal) be part of the 
Trade Practices Act (1974) introduced as a section of the small business statement by 
the government. It is more flexible, and is relatively easy to amend if it loses 
effectiveness due to the dynamics of the industry, unlike legislation. 
The Oilcode entails provision for the code of conduct for a petroleum retail sector that 
can be enforced legally. It comprises the introduction of new procedures for settling 
disputes between firms, including independent retail operators. It also makes 
provision for new competitors to have access to the existing major oil refineries and to 
product exchange arrangements. The cornerstones of the "Strengthened" Oilcode are: 
1) Pre-contractual disclosure, designed to deal with problems of information 
asymmetries, so that decisions are taken with full knowledge of prevailing 
conditions. 
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2) Alternative dispute-resolution aimed at maintaining commercial relationships 
in a manner that is mutually acceptable to solving any disputes that may arise. 
This also allows the "Strengthened" Oilcode to be legally enforceable. 
The reform policy of the petroleum retail sector was passed in July 1998. The main 
objectives of the reforms are to encourage competition; protect consumers; and protect 
small business (Bills digest, 1998). 
Removal of the prices' surveillance on 1 August 1998 marked the first phase of the 
reforms. An independent price monitoring system was established, being co-operation 
between the oil companies and the Australian Automobile Association. This is 
intended to provide a continuous check on petroleum prices. In addition, the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission will perform an oversight duty on 
petroleum prices to make sure that the benefits of liberalising the industry are passed 
on to the consumer. 
The second phase involved Repealing the Sites and Franchise Acts, and the 
introduction of the "Strengthened" Oilcode. These, however, were rejected in the 
August 1999 negotiations in the industry (Caltex, 1998: http://www.caltex.com.au). 
This was disappointing to stakeholders who would like free and fair competition in the 
industry. 
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S.NEW ZEALAND CASE STUDY 
A number of regulations governed the New Zealand petroleum industry until 
deregulation in 1988. These had a number of effects in the way business was conducted 
in the industry and how decisions were made. This discussion beginS with a review of 
the situation before deregulation, and continues to the current situation. 
5.1 Previous regulations 
The oil companies paid the refinery for processing their crude oil, and the government 
set the rate charged. It was determined in a manner that allowed the New Zealand 
Refining Company shareholders to recover costs and provide a reasonable (12.5%) 
return on investment. In this way the refiners were under no pressure to improve their 
services and operational efficiency, as their returns were guaranteed. 
The government also set the wholesale price in such a way as to allow wholesalers to 
recover costs and a certain percentage return on investments made in wholesaling. 
This was in line with what was happening in the refining activity. Refiners had limited 
incentives to improve on their operations. Wholesalers were also not pressing them to 
reduce the charged fees for processing their oil, since they could recover costs from the 
market anyway. 
Wholesalers and retailers got licenses from the government to operate in the industry. 
Company margins were also controlled, and so were prices. The Motor Spirit Licensing 
Authority was responsible for issuing licenses for the development of retail sites. A 
number of factors were considered in the process. These included determining whether 
there was a requirement for a retail outlet in a particular area, and the viability, size 
and position of the outlet (ACIL, 1997). Thus a potential entrant's application could be 
rejected on the basis of one or more of these conditions. This made entry into the 
industry difficult. Retail operators also had to obtain licenses for upgrading or 
expanding the existing stations. 
On the question of ownership of sites, the Motor Spirits Distribution Act, 1953 forbade 
ownership of retail sites by wholesalers. There was no limit to the number of sites that 
could be owned by individuals. This was introduced at the time of salus trading when 
retailers contracted with individual oil companies to sell only the particular company's 
brand at the retail station. This discouraged any price competition and rationalisation. 
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The government intended to provide low prices to consumers but also ensure a fair 
return to the industry. 
Deregulation 
The New Zealand government started the process of liberalising its economy in 1987 as 
a way of withdrawing its active participation in business and a way of allowing 
crowding in of private investment. Different sectors considered ways of opening to 
market forces in response to the government's calls. The energy sector was no 
exception, and the petroleum sector was deregulated in May 1988 in line with reforms 
that were implemented throughout the economy. This put an end to the tight 
regulations in the petroleum industry. 
Under the new arrangements, oil companies were not forced to process their crude at 
the New Zealand Refinery. The New Zealand Refining Company then needed to 
become efficient in order to compete with world refineries. Because deregulation of the 
industry happened at the time when the New Zealand Refining Company was being 
expanded, the government took responsibility for the payment of loans taken for that 
purpose. The refinery was also compensated for breached contractual agreements, 
entered into when the expansion started, before deregulation. It was guaranteed a floor 
income, and the oil companies committed themselves to utilising the refinery'S 
capacity. Wholesale and retail1icensing was abandoned. Wholesalers were no longer 
prohibited from owning retail sites, and controls on prices were discontinued. 
The industry operations came under normal legislation governing the competitiveness 
of industries generally, namely, the Commerce Act of 1986. The main objective of this 
act is to promote competition in New Zealand markets. Other general legislation to 
which the industry is subjected includes the Resources Management Act 1991, the 
Dangerous Goods Act, 1974 and the Petroleum Products Specification Regulation, 
1995. 
In addition, the oil companies, in conjunction with the department of labour, 
developed an Oil Industry Code of Practice. This, however, was not a formal 
regulation. It was a voluntary agreement, meant to ensure that companies conform to 
design, installation and operation of petroleum storage system specifications (ACIL, 
1997). 
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5.2 Current structure of industry after deregulation 
Petroleum production and trade 
New Zealand produces crude, but not enough to cover demand. Significant quantities 
of crude are imported. Imported crude comes mainly from Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates and Australia. 
Petroleum supply 
The industry consists of four major oil companies, transport companies, independent 
operators, and service station owners and operators. The Marsden Point Refinery is the 
main domestic refinery. Products from the refinery are shipped to seaboard terminals 
or piped to the terminals in South Auckland. Products are then transported to service 
stations and independent consumers by rail, road tankers and trucks. Petroleum 
product sources include the refinery, imports and, until recently, a synthetic gasoline 
plant. 
New Zealand Refining Company (Ltd) (NZRC) at Marsden Point, which started 
operation in 1964, supplies about 75% of New Zealand's petroleum product demand. 
Its main shareholders are BP Oil NZ Ltd (23.7%); Mobil Oil NZ Ltd (19.2%); Shell NZ 
Holding Company Ltd (17.2%); Fletcher Challenge Petroleum Ltd (14.2%) and Caltex 
NZ Ltd (11.4%). The general public and institutional investors have a 14.4% holding. 
The oil companies own the crude oil and the NZRC charges them a fee for refining 
their oil. When the Marsden refinery started operation, it had a refining capacity of 75 
000 bpd, but was expanded to 95 000 bpd at a cost of $1.8 billion in 1986. According to 
ACIL the major investment was in the construction of a hydro-cracker unit to increase 
production of diesel fuel and jet fuel. The refineries' product composition as at 1996 is 
depicted in figure 4.17. 
7 Percentages are own calculations from ACIL (1997) production figures. 
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The establishment of a synthetic gasoline plant in 1986 also contributed to the 
increased production of products. Before the expansion, a significant amount of 
products was imported. Following the expansion, NZ became a net exporter of 
petroleum products in 1988-89 (ACIL, 1997). However, the closure of the synthetic 
gasoline plant (noted below) and the increased petroleum product demand in the 
domestic market led to an end of exports in 1994. Again NZ became a net importer of 
petroleum products, especially motor spirits. 
As from 1995, it was arranged for the refinery to receive 70% of the Gross Refining Margin 
(that is, the difference between the landed price at New Zealand ports of all products produced 
by the refinery and the landed price of crude oil at the refinery). Both the crude and product 
prices are based on quoted Singapore prices. 
Synthetic production 
The government and Mobil jointly owned the synthetic gasoline plant that started 
operation in October1985, each with a 75% and 25 % share respectively. New Zealand 
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Synthetic Fuels Corporation operated the plant. It converted natural gas to synthetic 
gasoline. Its plant capacity increased from 10 000 to 15 000 barrels per day. 
The products from the plant were shipped to the Marsden Point Refinery for blending, 
and sold directly to the domestic market in different regions, with the remainder being 
exported. Exports of synthetic gasoline stopped in 1994, while the domestic 
consumption declined from close to 30% of motor spirit demand in 1992, finally 
dropping to zero. 
The closure of the synthetic gasoline section was the result of a shift in emphasis from 
producing synthetic gasoline producing export quality methanol, following strong 
demand for this in Asia. 
Petroleum demand 
The major products are unleaded motor spirit, dual-purpose kerosene, diesel fuel, jet 
fuel, fuel oil, bitumen and sulphur. Motor spirit and diesel represent the largest 
demand. Between 1985 and 1995, the demand for diesel increased more than that for 
petrol, as a result of lower taxation on diesel. ACIL (1997) states that motor spirit 
consumption increased towards the end of the 1980's due to a decrease in the use of 
compressed natural gas following the abandonment of financial incentives by the 
government for using it, however the growth rate was still lower than that for diesel. 
Since January 1996, two grades of motor spirit have been in use, namely unleaded 
regular and unleaded premium. The production and importation of leaded motor 
spirit ceased in January 1996 and the sale for use on the road was prohibited in October 
of the same year (Scott, 1997). Unleaded regular motor spirit was introduced in 1987 
and accounts for 70% of motor spirit demand. 75% of that demand is concentrated in 
the North Island. According to ACIL (1997), half of the total consumption of motor 
spirits is accounted for by the three largest cities. 
T ransporta tion 
The Wiri terminal south of Auckland has the largest throughput of 2 billion litres per 
year. It is owned by NZRC and leased to Wiri Oil Services Ltd owned by the oil 
companies. It is connected to the Marsden Point Refinery by a 170km pipeline owned 
and operated by NZRC. Oil companies own another 7km pipeline from Wiri to the jet 
fuel tanks in Auckland airport. 
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The cost of shipping fuel around the country is divided among oil companies 
according to usage and market share, averaging the cost of products at coastal 
terminals. This accounts for the almost uniform prices between main ports. Consumers 
in areas away from the refinery benefit since they are cross- subsidised. ACIL (1997) 
estimates each company's market share to be around 27%, with only Caltex having a 
lower share just below 20%. 
Products are transported from terminals to inland depots and service stations by road 
and rail transport. Oil companies use their own fleets, or contract out transport 
companies to deliver fuel to their customers. The use of rail, previously the dominant 
method of transporting petroleum products, declined after the rationalisation of the 
transport sector. This meant doing away with the maximum limit on truck distances. 
Trucks became the preferred means to transport petroleum. 
Marketing 
The major oil companies provide products to various customers in the NZ market. 
Motor spirit sales account for 65% of the sales at retail outlets while inland diesel 
represents only 33%. The total number of service stations in 1997 was estimated at 
about 1900 compared to 2814 that existed in 1986. This shows that the rationalisation of 
service stations, which is said to have been happening since the 1970's, resulted in a 
significant reduction of service stations in NZ. 
The effect of deregulation has been seen with regard to ownership, size and services 
offered at service stations. Since deregulation, the number of stations that are 
independently owned has declined, following the sale of most independent businesses 
to oil companies. The various ownership types currently existing can be classified as 
follows: 
Dealer owned/ operated. The dealer owns the station, or leases it from an independent 
company. Supplies are obtained from the oil companies. These are independents, 
although some may display brands of major oil companies. Largely, they own sites that 
have low volumes and are in rural areas. The approximately 60% that fall in this 
category are in the South Island. 
Lessee operated. A service station is leased from an oil company, and displays the brand 
of the particular company. These represent 20% of stations. 
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Company /agent operated. The oil-company owns or leases the site. An agent who 
receives commission for each litre of fuel sold, manages it on behalf of the company. 
These represent 20% of the stations. The retail sites owned by oil companies tend to be 
those situated along major roads, selling large volumes, or show a potential to be 
developed into larger volume stations. 
The change in ownership made possible by the deregulation of the industry by 
allowing oil companies to own sites has promoted investment in high volume service 
stations (ACIL, 1997). Many sites have become multi-service sites, providing a range of 
services to consumers. These range from convenience stores, car washes, multi lane 
courts and payment at the pumps. Such services have increased to the extent that they 
represent a significant proportion of petrol site revenue. A feature that is still prevalent 
is full attendance at the service stations. This is viewed as increasing the costs by 
around two cents per litre. 
Petrol pricing 
The final price of petrol consists of a number of components, of which taxes constitute 
over 40% of the price. The typical price of unleaded motor spirit is made up of 
government duties (excise, comprised of Consolidated Fund and Land Transport Fund 
used on road infrastructure), petroleum fuel monitoring levy, the local authorities 
petroleum tax and the accident compensation corporation levy to which product costs 
are added. For diesel, the composition is different For example according to ACIL 
there are no excise duties for diesel, since diesel vehicles are all subjected to road user 
charges that vary according to type of the vehicle. Note that the excise from which 
diesel is exempted makes up 70% of the tax component of motor spirit price. Thus 
diesel users pay for instance only around 10 c/l road user charge for a 3 ton vehicle, 
plus a lesser percentage of the government taxes (Goods and Services Tax and Local 
Authorities Petroleum Tax) compared to a motor spirit user.8 Thus there is an incentive 
for using diesel. 
5.3 Competition in the industry 
The situation in the industry can be discussed through the analysis of the current 
situation to determine whether it encourages competition in the industry or whether 
8 Details of motor spirit & diesel pricing example in ACIL, 1997:29. 
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there are high barriers to entry. Barriers to entry could be in the form of absolute cost 
advantage, economies of scale and regulatory barriers. Each of these is discussed 
below. 
Access to infrastructure: This refers to the fact that incumbents may face potential cost 
advantage against potential new entrants. This could be due to various reasons. The 
incumbent could own an important input needed by the entrant to be able to compete 
in the industry. In that case, if the incumbent is the only supplier of that superior input, 
it can withhold the input from the potential competitor as a way of forcing the 
competitor to use an inferior input and/or completely discouraging entry into the 
industry. 
In the petroleum industry, that input could be crude oil especially in a situation where 
imports of petroleum products are not allowed. This, however, is not the case in the 
New Zealand industry. The oil industry is deregulated, crude can be imported and the 
potential entrant can also source its products from international markets. Incumbents 
cannot be said to have cost advantages in that regard. 
The incumbent oil companies own the 7 km pipeline from the Wiri terminal to the 
airport, and lease the 170 km pipeline, but even the whole terminal capacity is not 
enough to cover the market demand. There are also other terminals where the major 
companies have no control. Secondly, the transport sector is also deregulated; meaning 
the use of road transport is another option. 
The oil companies enjoy benefits that the new entrants are not in a position to share. 
The fact that there are other terminals, not under control of the oil companies, can be 
used as an argument that there are opportunities available to new entrants. In reality, 
these are not as attractive as the terminals under the incumbents' control. The pipeline 
from Wiri terminal is the shortest, and connects to a major refinery. The other pipelines 
connecting to the same refinery need to be longer than this. The longer the pipeline, the 
higher are the costs which the entrants have to incur. 
As regards the deregulated road transport system, the amount that can efficiently be 
transported by road is minimal compared to pipeline transportation. Forcing a 
competitor to use this form of transport is effectively forcing the competitor to use an 
inferior input. 
94 
New Zealand case study 
Economies of scale: As pointed out earlier, this refers to a situation where the costs are 
reduced as output increases. That is, the minimum efficient scale is large in relation to 
the size of the market, so that there are gains in utilising only one or few plants, and is 
associated with large capital investments. Some argue that scale economies form a 
barrier to entry. Refinery is the point in question under this category. The NZ industry 
is small (consuming 90 000 bpd) relative to the efficient scale of a modern refinery. 
Scherer (1996) estimates the minimum efficient scale to be around two times larger 
than the size of the NZRC. The size of the refinery, it should be noted, depends on the 
level of demand and transportation. Constructing a refinery presently therefore may 
not be efficient, considering that New Zealand is situated relatively far from major 
markets in Asia and elsewhere. 
Another point to be considered is that entry does not have to occur at all levels of the 
production chain. So, even if entry at refining seems unprofitable, it can still be 
possible at wholesaling or retailing. Also, refined products can be imported. A 
disadvantage to the potential entrant could be if the only way to source the product 
was by utilising the refinery's output. However, this argument applies in a situation 
where the refiners are not also marketers and retailers. With deregulation, wholesalers 
are allowed to participate in retailing. This could place small independents at a 
competitive disadvantage if there is no open access to infrastructure. 
Regulatory and institutional barriers: The deregulation of the industry in 1988 was 
expected to bring competition and remove any barriers deterring entry into the 
industry. There had to be some general regulations though, even after that, to which 
the industry is subjected. These are the Commerce Act 1986, Resources Management 
Act, Petroleum product specifications Act and Dangerous Goods Act. 
The Commerce Act, 1986 is to encourage competition in New Zealand markets by 
ensuring that, among other things, the behaviour of incumbents does not deter entry. It 
does not protect one group at the expense of another. A barrier would be created if it 
protected incumbents from competition of imported products. There are no barriers in 
the form of quotas or tariffs. Specifications laid out in the other regulations regarding 
sale of petroleum products, setting up of storage equipment and service stations, and 
environment are the same for all industry participants. 
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There may be costs associated with complying with some of the regulations, but this is 
not to say that these are barriers. They apply to everyone doing business in the 
industry, and should not be regarded as barriers. 
The costs of shipping products around the country are divided among companies 
according to market share. The terms governing a new entrant's access to 
infrastructure are not clear. The new entrant, would have to compete with the majors 
on a commercial basis since the industry is deregulated. The fact that there is no 
regulation ensuring that all willing participants have fair access to infrastructure is a 
barrier to entry. If there was open access to infrastructure this would not be a barrier. 
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6.1 History of intervention 
The oil industry is economically and strategically important to all countries. The 
development phases of the international oil industry led to increased-government 
intervention throughout the world. The aim was to put in place mechanisms to reduce 
heavy reliance on imported oil. This meant diversification to other energy sources and 
tight regulation of petroleum industries for importers of oiL For producers, it meant 
increased government involvement through ownership, to maximise the share of 
government revenues from the natural resource. This situation, is however, changing. 
The trend now is towards the liberalisation of markets, to improve efficiency and to 
allow private investment in the industry. 
The idea of liberalisation is that minimum government intervention and an industry 
open to market forces would improve efficiency. Pareto-optimal allocation of 
resources, in which no one can be made better off without making some else worse off, 
guided the thinking. This, however, is a theoretical ideal that is seldom achieved. 
Liberalisation was thought to be a way to achieve some of the objectives of the ideal. 
6.2 Motivations for intervention 
There are important rationales for involving governments in the sector. There are 
natural monopoly characteristics in some parts of the supply chain that require the 
intervention of the government on the grounds of protecting consumers from 
monopoly abuse. 
Other motivations for government intervention include the development of the 
domestic industry, socio-economic development, the generation of cash for 
government and inadequate information regarding the markets. The government 
retains the provision of social services in most cases (although this is slowly changing). 
This function is closely related to that of regulating the domestic industry, for example, 
ensuring supplies throughout the country. Parts of the local industry, particularly 
manufacturing, may still be in its infancy, and opening it to international competition 
may hinder further developments. Governments, in such cases, decide to protect 
certain industries for strategic and political reasons, even though, economically, the 
protection could not be justified. 
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The choice of the intervention tool depends both on the goals the government wants to 
achieve and the structure of the existing industry. The different tools include 
ownership, regulation, fiscal measures, trade instruments as well as research and 
development. After the second oil price shock, the ownership of industry and 
regulation including upstream and fiscal, were the most widely used instruments. 
6.3 Reasons for liberalisation 
During the 1980's, liberalisation of markets gained renewed importance. Various forces 
were pertinent both to driving economies to open their markets and to the procedures 
used as well. The most outstanding were inefficiency, lack of private investment and 
pressure from international lending agencies. 
In some countries lack of investment is one of the driving forces. Poor infrastructure 
that reqUired upgrading and expansion, that governments could not finance was 
characteristic in some countries. This made governments realise that the private sector 
could play an important role in that regard. 
State-owned oil-companies performed poorly, because of lack of incentives on the part 
of managers to operate efficiently. Lack of accountability and easy access to public 
funds were largely to blame. Governments started realising that the private sector can 
play an important role in the provision of commercial services. Nevertheless it should 
be recognised that some state-owned companies were efficient. 
International lending agencies playa role in forcing countries to open their markets. 
Countries who depend on these agencies to rescue their poorly performing economies 
are forced to comply by the rules of the lenders. This group of countries does not 
initiate liberalisation of their own petroleum sectors. 
6.4 Methods of liberalisation 
Different methods of liberalisation include privatisation, deregulation, foreign 
investment and liberalisation of trade. Where the government was involved in the 
industry through ownership, the first step towards liberalisation is usually the 
privatisation of the state oil-company. It is important to bear in mind that privatisation 
is used as a means towards achieving the overall objective of liberalising the sector. It is 
not the end in itself. 
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There are different methods of privatisation. The method chosen depends on the 
underlying objective and the structure and status of the industry. The various methods 
of privatisation include preparations such as restructuring, commercialisation and 
corporatisation. The actual privatisation might be by way of joint venture, direct sale, 
public shares and employee/management buyout. If, for example, the main objective 
of privatisation were to generate cash for the government, the sale of assets would be 
the method followed. 
6.5 Overall lessons from case studies 
The various cases considered are state-owned companies that were privatised before 
the industry could be liberalised, and regulated petroleum industries. This will help 
give a picture of the situations that can be expected from the experiences of these 
different categories of countries. 
6.5.1 State owned oil companies 
There are two categories of state-owned monopoly oil-companies, namely those in 
which poor performance and lack of commercial objectives, were the main drivers for 
liberalising the industry, namely Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru; and those where the 
state oil-companies performed satisfactorily, namely Brazil, and Thailand, but the need 
for private investment was the driver for liberalisation. 
In both circumstances there were difficulties in deciding whether the government 
should give up ownership of the company completely or only reduce its share. This 
raised concerns on the part of private investors about the sincerity of the government 
regarding its attihlde to free and fair competition. 
Consultations that enabled informed planning, and defined the objectives and 
direction that the process would follow, were important in driving the process 
forward. Also, transparency of the whole process was one important factor that 
allowed progress in all the cases considered. All the stakeholders felt they should be 
part of important changes in their industry. In successful cases, possible problems were 
discussed before hand with those that would be affected. 
6.5.2 The previously regulated petroleum industries 
In these countries, the petroleum industries were regulated and different motivations 
that led to partial or fullliberalisation of the industries were observed. These included 
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lack of competition, compliance with the demands of international lending agencies, 
lack of incentives to be efficient, overall change in economic and industry policy. 
Among the countries considered in this paper, New Zealand is the only country that 
can be said to have fully deregulated the industry. Despite this, there are stakeholders 
that are still concerned about the presence of free and fair competition in the industry, 
pointing towards the existence of barriers to entry even after the industry is 
deregulated. There is no fair access to infrastructure, and therefore competition is not 
fair. The fact that there is an arrangement among existing companies to have access 
and pay costs according to market share may disadvantage a new entrant. 
The rest of the countries partially deregulated their industries for a number of reasons. 
Some were characterised by a lack of consensus as to whether the industry should be 
liberalised. This created problems for further steps towards fully liberalising the 
industry. The dissatisfaction of certain stakeholders with the process, as a result, led to 
rising tensions between the different stakeholders and governments, and delays in 
completion of the process. This shows the importance of a transparent process where 
all the parties concerned understand the problem and understand what liberalisation 
will entaiL 
In the cases of Kenya and Philippines, one group of stakeholders, the major oil 
companies, have ended up being the only group that benefits from the unsatisfactorily 
liberalised industry. Unfortunately this is the same group that benefited from a 
regulated industry. 
The case of the Philippines, of a previously regulated industry where the deregulation 
law was reversed, and passed again, was an exceptional case among the cases 
reviewed in this paper. It is not clear what the outcomes of the current law will be, but 
already there are once again calls for scrapping the law from the dissatisfied 
stakeholders. Consultations, a better analysis of the situation and clear objectives and 
direction, could be better if held before the decision is made for the well being of the 
whole industry. The situation points towards a lack of consensus and understanding of 
what liberalisation should entail. 
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6.6 Lessons for SA 
6.6.1 The need for change 
International relations largely shaped the development of the SA petroleum industry 
during the apartheid era. Driven by the desire for energy security in the face of the UN 
embargo against the apartheid government, liquid fuel policies centred on self-
sufficiency. Decisions regarding investments and regulation of the petroleum industry 
were determined by such international developments. As a result of this, a culture of 
secrecy and complicated negotiations between the government itself and the industry 
characterised the industry itself. 
The Petroleum Products Act 1977 made effective the secrecy that governed the 
industry. It forbade "publication, releasing, announcement, disclosure or conveyance to any 
person of information or the making of comment regarding the source, manufacture, 
transportation, destination, storage, consumption, quantity or stock level of any petroleum 
product acquired or manufactured or being acquired or manufactured for or in the Republic" 
(DME, 1998:9). 
The new government inherited these policies that are now in the process of being 
reviewed. The apartheid era is over. A policy of self-sufficiency in liquid fuels is no 
longer relevant, hence regulations that were designed to meet this objective are 
inappropriate. 
6.6.2 Competition in the industry 
The industry operates under a set of complicated regulations, not conducive to free 
and fair competition. The main regulations as discussed in Chapter 1 will be analysed 
with respect to their implications for competition in the industry. 
The retail price of petrol is determined through a complicated formula that takes into 
account the prices of four refineries from which SA would typically import product, 
plus wharfage, insurance and other charges. Price control through the use of import 
parity pricing is thought to be the best pOSSible system in the current regulated 
industry. There are many components in the final price of fuel that do not account for 
the actual cost of supplying fuel to the consumer, other than government taxes. 
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These components are a result of negotiations and agreements entered into during the 
apartheid era. The oil companies were, and are, guaranteed a margin for refining crude 
in return for uplilting the locally produced synthetic fuels. 
The control of imports shields the local refineries from competition, and guarantees 
utilisation of their products in addition to the guaranteed a certain import parity 
selling price for the refinery output and a certain margin for marketing both crude 
derived and synthetic products. This is a disadvantage to new entrants who do not 
own a refinery. Although there are product exchanges among the refiners, new 
entrants who rely on product supply from local refiners are not on a level playing field 
with their competitors, who are also their suppliers. It is understood that the 
government currently gives new entrants priority regarding import permits. Control of 
imports is also against the World Trade Agreements (Burger, 1999). 
Imported products are shipped through pipelines and transported inland using 
Petronet's tariffs. Petronet is an unregulated natural monopoly who can abuse 
customers by charging high price and impacting on the final price of fuel. 
The promotion of synfuels has a reinforcing effect on import controls. It is not possible 
to support the production of synfuels without import controls, in the light of existing 
agreements. However, Sasol gave notice to end the industry agreement, which is 
expected to lead to a new set of regulations. 
The ratplan controls the number, location, ownership and operation of service stations 
and prohibits self-service at petrol stations. This is said to promote development of 
small businesses and protect the jobs of petrol attendants. While it is noted that the 
ratplan made possible the allocation of new rosters to new entrants, it is anti-
competitive. The study conducted by the Competition Board (1994) in which it found 
certain clauses of the agreement to be against the principles of the competition act 
supports this. In a free and fair competitive environment, market conditions determine 
the opening or closure of a business. 
6.6.3 Current context 
The UN embargo against SA, that shaped the policies around regulation of the 
petroleum industry, was lilted in 1993. The economic and political situation changed 
with the re-acceptance of SA into the international community. 
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There are also significant changes taking place in the petroleum industries around the 
world, following the period of oil crises. An important realisation is that there is a shift 
from the need to achieve energy security through self-sufficiency to achieving energy 
security through increasing energy supply options, by cross-country trade and 
diversification. 
There is, therefore, a need for policies more appropriate to the new environment. The 
domestic petroleum industry policy has to integrate international trends by adopting 
relevant examples into the local environment. 
6.6.4 Main objectives 
As SA embraces the international community, sensitivity to domestic conditions and 
problems is very important. There is a trend towards market-oriented petroleum 
sectors around the world. SA faces the challenge of transforming the petroleum sector 
from the secretive, regulated industry to a market oriented one, while making sure that 
stated government objectives are met. 
Each country implements the reforms in a manner that suits the country's situation and 
circumstances. The general underlying goal is to open the industry to market forces. 
How far the process continues is a matter that should be monitored and determined by 
the government. 
SA is in a critical stage of development, and building investors' confidence is crucial. 
The government articulated its intentions to delre-regulate the liquid fuels sector after 
some specified milestones are achieved. 
• Availability of fuel in rural areas at affordable prices 
• 25% Black economic empowerment (BEE) through ownership or control in all 
levels of the industry 
• Maintenance of full service at the petrol stations 
• Promotion of small business 
• Protect jobs 
• Guard against abuse of market power 
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• Protect investments in synfuels industry 
• Optimise the use of existing investments 
Impacts 
SA should learn from all the cases reviewed in this paper, as there were different 
outcomes. An important observation to be made is whether the intended results were 
achieved in each. In a country like SA, that is still trying to build its economy, and is 
eager to attract private investment, consistency and precision in policy objectives is of 
the utmost importance. This creates a good picture for investors one where the 
government is committed to favourable business environment and long term goals. 
This in turn will contribute to building a stable economic environment, and build 
investors' confidence. 
The impacts of liberalising the petroleum sector in other countries will be assessed in 
terms of prices, rural-urban price differences, closure of service stations and entry of 
new players. 
• Prices 
The majority of poor South Africans live in rural areas where the price of fuel is likely 
to be high should the industry be deregulated. The experiences of Kenya and the 
Philippines shed light in this regard. When the industries opened to competition, 
prices of petroleum products rose to levels even higher than during the pre-
liberalisation period. This is contrary to what the liberalisation was intended for. 
The structure of the market in Kenya did not change after liberalisation, which may 
account for the high prices paid for fuel. The few, big oil companies, that operated in 
the industry before, manipulate prices as they wish. The levels of competition did not 
change either. The major oil companies practice price leadership. 
In the Philippines where new entrants into the industry could be expected to bring 
competition, the big oil companies are the price-setters. The entry of new players with 
about 8.7% market share in the retail sector has not brought any meaningful 
competition. 
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The multi-national oil companies dominated the petroleum sector in these two 
countries before liberalisation, a characteristic existing in South Africa. It must be 
pointed out though that in the Kenyan case there are two factors that could be 
responsible for failure to realise the expected benefits of liberalisation. Firstly, that 
there were no proper regulatory measures in place to carry the process through. 
Secondly the remaining regulations could be working against liberalisation. 
• Rural -urban price differences 
Urban-rural price differences are observed following liberalisation of the sector. The 
tendency is for prices to be higher in rural areas than in urban areas. This is the case in 
Australia. It is because prices are cost-reflective. Consumers in rural areas are far away 
from the refineries, and those areas are characterised by low demand and high 
distribution costs. 
How rural consumers are ensured affordable fuel without resorting to subsidies is an 
issue that requires careful consideration. It is important to note that in instances where 
subsidies are "unavoidable", the government welcomes transparent administration 
(DME, 1998:31). 
The Prices Surveillance Authority in Australia placed a cap on prices charged by the oil 
companies, to ensure lower country prices at the expense of capital city consumers. 
This allowed minimum government intervention while protecting the interests of rural 
consumers and encouraging the development of small business. Despite this, rural 
consumers pay a higher price for fuel than consumers in urban areas do reflecting high 
distribution costs of supplying those areas. Price capping allowed commercial 
principles to be retained. 
• Closure of service stations 
The liberalisation of the petroleum sector resulted in the closure of more than half the 
service stations that existed in New Zealand bef_ore liberalisation. The majority of the 
dosed stations were the low volume sites. These are likely to be in the rural areas of 
SA. 
The impact of the closure of service stations is threefold. It means the loss of jobs for 
petrol attendants. It is the aim of the government to protect jobs of petrol attendants by 
securing full service. Jobs lost through rationalisation of this nature may not be 
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avoidable. Secondly, access to fuel in rural communities would be difficult, as it is 
stations in these areas, with low throughput that are more likely to close. Thirdly, new 
small retail level entrants may be easily driven out of business through the closure of 
stations. Other service businesses such as general retailers, mechanics operating in the 
service stations will close. The development of small business can be threatened in a 
deregulated industry. 
The objective of the government of making fuel available throughout the country at 
affordable prices may then be compromised in a deregulated environment. Also, the 
closures would be contrary to promoting small business. Re-regulation, therefore, is 
needed to achieve this objective. 
It is worth mentioning that in only one country in this review, Thailand, was there an 
increase in the number of service stations and small businesses in the industry 
following the liberalisation of the sector. 
• Entry of new players 
One of the reasons for liberalising the sector is to encourage the entry of new and small 
businesses into the industry. The extent to which this objective was realised, for 
example, in New Zealand, is cause for concern about the fairness of competition in that 
industry. Significant numbers of new entrants in the industry were only seen from 
1997, a decade after the industry was deregulated. Although it is not clear what the 
reasons for that were, it is cause for concern in SA, if there are lessons to be learned. 
In Kenya, the industry was deregulated in 1994, but the number of players has not 
changed. A number of factors can be said to be responsible for this. Among these is the 
unwillingness of the existing players to share the facilities with new entrants. 
Philippines saw entry of new players both local and international. This is one of the 
expected results of liberalisation. The new players are expected to contribute 
significantly to increase investment and development of infrastructure in the country. 
However, the new entrants have not been in a position to exact significant changes 
with regard to prices. This could mean that effective competition in the industry has 
not started. 
If SA is to realise the objective of 25% BEE, cases like these need to be investigated. For 
meaningful BEE to be achieved, a lot has to be done to ensure a level playing field for 
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all players in the industry. The multinational companies operating in SA control most 
of the existing infrastructure. How previously disadvantaged groups, at which the BEE 
is directed, obtain ownership and fair access to infrastructure can better be managed in 
a regulated environment. 
The review of the deregulation experiences of other countries shows a trend but not 
much on what can be a lesson to SA. There is a need to draw on specific areas that can 
be adapted to the SA case, in a manner that will allow flexibility when a need arises for 
regulation to be reviewed. 
Therefore, re-regulation of the sector until such time as the industry has adjusted to 
market principles is appropriate. Re-regulation will mean a review of the mainly 
inappropriate regulations, namely the ratplan, and promotion of synfuels and pricing. 
Certain sections of the ratplan can still be incorporated into the reviewed regulations to 
see to it that new entrants are accommodated, as is currently the case. It may be 
necessary also to retain some sections of the ratplan, for example, prohibiting vertical 
integration, to protect small businesses. 
With regard to uplifting synfuels, Sasol has already given a notice to terminate the 
agreement with the industry by 2003. This should be the starting point for the 
government in its attempts to re-regulate the industry. Negotiations over the future of 
Mossgas need to be finalised. 
Import control should remain until the review of the other regulations is complete. 
This would allow an appropriate regulatory framework to be developed. Only after 
that time could the debates about whether the industry should be deregulated 
resumed, if still necessary. Presently, all SA needs are regulations appropriate to the 
current environment. For example, it is not clear how products' imports can be allowed 
while the companies currently operating in the industry have to uplift synfuel 
production. The removal of import control is expected to attract new entrants who will 
compete with the existing companies. H competition in the industry is to be 
meaningful, promoting the local industry'S products needs to be dealt with first, or the 
existing companies will be at a competitive disadvantage. 
There is a strong international trend towards liberalisation, however, there are no 
guaranteed results. Hence re-regulation of the industry is justified. Some instruments 
that can be applied are price- capping, and the review of the ratplan. 
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Price-capping allows minimum government intervention, while also allowing some 
degree of competition in the industry. It would protect consumers from the potential 
danger of big oil companies colluding over prices. Also rural-urban price differences 
are allowed as a means of retaining commercial principles. 
SA needs to alter its system to achieve specific objectives; that is, re-regulation must be 
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